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Foreword
I
n today’s more integrated world economy, agricultural growth in Africa depends not only 
on raising productivity and increasing production, but on increasing the competitiveness of 
African agriculture in the global market and expanding its market opportunities within 
Africa. Unless demand increases, African agriculture cannot grow at a rate sufficient to 
  reduce poverty and hunger to any substantial degree. The accelerated economic growth in 
Africa in recent years might offer increased opportunities for agriculture from domestic 
demand. 
  This research report focuses on demand-side constraints on African agricultural growth 
and their implications for three broad agricultural development strategies: promoting tradi-
tional exports, developing nontraditional exports, and increasing food-staple growth. Applying 
a general equilibrium framework to seven East and southern African countries, the study finds 
that an export-led agricultural growth strategy is unlikely to generate substantial overall in-
come growth, even though demand need not constrain rapid growth in some nontraditional 
exports. Increasing production of staple foods seems to offer a promising avenue for agricul-
tural growth, given that Africa’s supply of many staple commodities does not meet its current 
demand. However, the report shows that increasing productivity in the grain sector without a 
substantial increase in market demand would cause domestic market prices to fall; as a result, 
farmers would lose much of the benefit of increased productivity. Thus, changes outside the 
farm sector itself—reduced marketing costs and more rapid growth in the nonfarm econo-
my—are required to provide sufficient market demand to support rapid agricultural growth. 
In addition, to increase agricultural productivity, a second major engine of growth—increased 
productivity growth outside the agricultural sector—is a necessary condition for rapid econo-
mywide growth and poverty reduction.
  Agricultural growth can play a major role in overall growth and poverty reduction in Af-
rica. But development strategies need to take an economywide perspective to enable agricul-
ture to play its crucial role in growth and poverty reduction in Africa. 
Joachim von Braun
Director General, IFPRI viii
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Summary
I
n today’s more integrated world economy, agricultural growth in the countries of East and 
Southern Africa depends crucially on increasing their competitiveness in the world agri-
cultural market and expanding their market opportunities. This report focuses on demand-
side constraints on agricultural growth and their implications for three broad alternative agri-
cultural development strategies: promoting traditional exports, developing nontraditional 
exports, and increasing food staple growth. We address three major questions. First, how con-
straining will demand be for future agricultural growth in East and Southern Africa and, in 
particular, is there sufficient demand to permit agriculture to grow at a rate that can signifi-
cantly reduce poverty and hunger? Second, if technological change and increase in supply are 
achieved, which agricultural subsectors offer the greatest potential and can become the most 
powerful engine for raising real incomes and increasing food consumption? Finally, what are 
the implications of reductions in marketing costs and growth linkages with nonagricultural 
sectors for achieving increased market demand for agricultural products?
  The report applies a general equilibrium framework for the analysis, focusing on seven 
East and Southern African countries—Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe—and finds that an export-led agricultural growth strategy is unlikely 
to generate substantial overall income growth in these countries. Despite significant market 
reform initiatives, future growth prospects for traditional agricultural exports in many coun-
tries in the two regions do not appear promising, even if lost market shares are recovered 
through improvements in productivity, product quality and variety, and marketing conditions. 
Simulation of a recovery of traditional exports to their historical high levels results in only an 
additional 0.08–0.15 percent annual growth in per capita real GDP for the seven countries 
studied. The limited impact of an increase in traditional exports is due primarily to the fact 
that they now account for only a small portion of the GDP and production of these commodi-
ties has relatively weak economic linkages with other sectors in the domestic economy. More-
over, world prices for these commodities are currently rather low and their recovery in real 
terms to the levels of the early 1970s is unlikely.
  The report suggests that demand need not constrain rapid growth in nontraditional exports. 
Given the current minimal levels of production and their minute share of world trade, nontra-
ditional agricultural exports offer perhaps the most promising opportunities for growth. To a 
large extent, nontraditional exports consist of numerous products that are targeted to niche 
markets and the model simulation analysis shows that even under optimistic assumptions (for 
example, 10–24 percent annual export growth in the sample countries), acceleration of growth 
in this sector alone will have only a very limited effect on real GDP growth.
  Increasing production of staple foods would seem to offer a promising avenue for agricul-
tural growth, given that Africa’s own demand is already large ($18 billion/year for East Afri-
can and $12 billion/year for Southern African developing countries) and that the supply of 
many staple commodities is not sufficient to meet the current demand. Moreover, the total de-
mand for food in Africa is projected to increase in the next 10–20 years (for example, cereal 
demand will be 60 percent higher than the current level by 2015). However, an economywide x   SUMMARY
model simulation analysis shows that increasing productivity in the grain sector alone would 
cause a shift in domestic terms of trade that would have a negative impact on agriculture as 
domestic market prices fall, which would cancel out most benefits accruing to the farmers 
from the improvement in productivity. Increased substitution of domestic agricultural products 
for imported commodities through government intervention in grain markets could mitigate 
these adverse trends in terms of trade for farmers. Simultaneous increase in livestock produc-
tivity might also increase farmers’ incomes and spur demand for food and feed, which would 
m ak e  i t  m o r e  e ff ec ti v e  f o r  b o o s tin g  f arm  in c o m e s  th an  an  in cr e as e  in  cr o p  p r od u c ti v i ty 
alone.
  Nonetheless, the model simulations suggest that changes outside the farm sector itself—re-
duced marketing costs and more rapid growth in the nonfarm economy—are required to pro-
vide sufficient market demand to support rapid agricultural growth. Model simulations sug-
gest that a sharp reduction in marketing costs through investments in marketing infrastructure 
(for example, roads and bridges, ports, storage facilities, electricity) and development of mar-
ket institutions (see, for example, Kherallah et al. 2002) combined with agricultural productiv-
ity growth would raise per capita GDP growth by approximately 2 percent per year in the 
sample countries. Simulation results also suggest that, combined with nonagricultural produc-
tivity growth, productivity growth in agriculture results in per capita annual agricultural real 
income growth of 3.0–4.4 percent.
  Thus, agriculture, particularly productivity increases in food crops and livestock, can serve 
as one engine of growth, but without economywide growth, total demand for crops and live-
stock will be insufficient to prevent terms-of-trade declines. A second major engine of 
growth—increased productivity growth outside the agricultural sector—is a necessary condi-




he past 35 years have seen a dramatic shift in the international consensus on the impor-
tance of agriculture in economic development. From the 1960s through the 1980s, ag-
riculture was generally recognized as having a central role. By the 1990s, however, in-
terest in agriculture’s role in development had waned, with adverse consequences for many 
African countries that continued to face recurrent food crises, economic stagnation, and per-
sistent poverty (Hazell 2005). Today, agriculture is again a major item on the agenda for Sub-
Saharan Africa, although there remains considerable doubt in the international development 
community as to whether it can successfully generate sufficient growth in Africa (see, for ex-
ample, Maxwell and Slater 2003; Collier 2005; Ellis 2005).
  Pessimism regarding the future of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa is the result of a 
change in view on appropriate policy measures, concerns about the robustness of domestic 
demand, and perceptions of the implications of a changing global environment. Government 
policy instruments that supported the Green Revolution in Asian countries by improving re-
turns to agriculture, such as price supports, fertilizer and credit subsidies, and irrigation 
schemes, are less acceptable models for public sector intervention today (Ashley and Maxwell 
2001). Domestic demand, dampened by low incomes and high market transaction costs, is 
often deemed inadequate to translate increased production of food staples into increases in 
rural incomes. Long-term global declines in agricultural commodity prices have also under-
mined the profitability of agriculture as a business. Moreover, African agriculture faces new 
challenges from globalization, resulting in increased competition from both other developing 
countries and wealthy countries with agricultural subsidies. Growing concentration and inte-
gration of international markets, as well as increasingly demanding standards in terms of 
quality and food safety, pose additional challenges (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Reardon et 
al. 2003; Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003).
  What can be done to enhance market opportunities so that agriculture can become a more 
powerful engine for growth for the continent? Which markets and which products offer the 
greatest potential for raising incomes and increasing food consumption in Africa? To answer 
these questions requires an analysis of demand constraints on agricultural growth. Much of the 
earlier work on agricultural growth focused on means of boosting supply of agricultural prod-
ucts, a crucial first condition for growth. African farmers clearly need more public and private 
investment to provide additional resources for research and extension, for promoting rapid 
adoption of new technologies, and for adapting modern technology to local agroecological and 
socioeconomic conditions. However, lack of market opportunities for increased production and 
poorly functioning markets can also constrain agricultural growth, so recent studies have fo-
cused on the demand side and the role of markets in African agricultural growth. Dorward, 
Kydd, and Poulton (2005), for example, have pointed out the importance of market coordina-
tion and argue that coordination failure, by increasing transaction costs and discouraging mar-2   CHAPTER  1
ket participation, is one of the most impor-
tant factors behind the poor performance of 
the African agricultural sector.
  In this report, we focus on demand-side 
constraints and their implications for three 
broad alternative agricultural development 
strategies in East and Southern Africa: pro-
moting traditional exports, nontraditional 
exports, and food staple growth. The pur-
pose of this analysis, however, is not to de-
rive country-specific policy recommenda-
tions, but rather to examine development 
strategy issues faced by many countries in 
these regions. Nonetheless, the analysis does 
include some findings concerning particular 
countries, subject to the limitations of the 
dataset used for the general equilibrium 
modeling.
  Specifically, this report is designed to 
address three major questions faced by 
many countries in East and Southern Af-
rica: (1) How constraining will demand be 
for future agricultural growth and is there 
sufficient demand to permit agriculture to 
grow at a rate that can significantly reduce 
poverty and hunger?1 (2) If technological 
change and increases in supply are achieved, 
which agricultural subsectors have the best 
potential for raising real income and in-
creasing food consumption? (3) What are 
the implications of reductions in marketing 
costs and growth linkages with nonagricul-
tural sectors for achieving increasing mar-
ket demand for agricultural products?
  Through a combination of analyses of 
historical trends in agricultural exports, 
comparative advantages in intraregional 
trade, and various growth scenarios in a 
world general equilibrium model, we exam-
ine the impact of linkage between growth in 
agricultural demand and supply on overall 
economic growth and income, taking into 
account the internal demand constraints and 
diverse economic structures across a group 
of countries in East and Southern Africa. 
We find that traditional export crops face 
overall demand constraints that are reflected 
in long-term declines in terms of trade, al-
though there is scope for some countries to 
recoup lost market shares. However, if the 
goal is to cut rural poverty by 50 percent by 
2015 the potential income generated is small 
relative to the need.
  Owing to their relatively small base in 
many countries, nontraditional exports may 
be subject to fewer demand constraints than 
traditional exports, but they have limited 
potential to raise incomes on the scale re-
quired to affect overall economic growth 
and reduce poverty. The best prospects for 
agriculture-led growth in many African 
countries remain in the food sector, where 
domestic demand still represents a large and 
growing market. Improvements in market-
ing efficiency and simultaneous growth in 
the livestock sector (and feed demand) can 
help spur demand further and prevent the 
price declines that discourage grain produc-
tion. Achieving rapid gains in farm incomes, 
however, will require not only sustained 
  increases in agricultural output, but invest-
ments in rural infrastructure to reduce mar-
keting costs and enhance growth in nonagri-
cultural sectors in order to produce the 
income necessary to spur demand.
  In Chapter 2, we first examine trends in 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s traditional and non-
traditional agricultural exports and the 
structure of agricultural trade. Based on 
previous studies and recent experience of 
several African countries, we focus primar-
ily on world export market opportunities 
and constraints for a group of selected tradi-
tional and nontraditional commodities. In 
Chapter 3, we look at regional and domestic 
demand for food products, analyze compar-
ative advantages in regional trade, and eval-
uate the potential impact of regional and 
domestic markets on farm income and agri-
cultural growth. Chapter 4 presents the gen-
eral equilibrium model and discusses simu-
lation results derived from the model. 
Concluding observations and policy impli-
cations are offered in Chapter 5.
1AfDB (2002) for example, estimates a 7 percent of annual GDP growth for achieving the MDGs of halving 
the poverty in Africa.  3
CHAPTER 2
Agricultural Export Markets: 
Trends, Constraints, and Opportunities
A
griculture is widely recognized as a key to growth and the reduction of poverty in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Thus, the disappointing performance of the agricultural sector from 
the 1970s through the early 2000s in most of the countries in the region is seen as a 
major factor in increasing poverty. Although there were higher returns to some farmers in a 
few subsectors in some reforming countries, structural adjustment reforms introduced in the 
1980s and 1990s failed to produce substantial agricultural growth, owing in part to inconsis-
tent implementation (Dorosh, Sahn, and Younger 1996; Jayne et al. 1999; Kherallah et al. 
2002). Declines in public investment in rural infrastructure, agricultural research, and agri-
cultural extension also contributed to both stagnation in agricultural productivity and high 
market transaction costs.
  Consistent with the disappointing performance of agricultural production, Sub-Saharan 
African agricultural exports, particularly the traditional ones, have fared badly in many coun-
tries. In this chapter, we first examine trends and prospects for these traditional exports, which 
still account for the major share of agricultural export earnings in most countries. We then 
discuss nontraditional exports, some of which have enjoyed extremely rapid growth, though 
from a limited base. Prospects for trade in staple crops and livestock, including intraregional 
trade, are discussed in Chapter 3.
Traditional Exports: 
Increased Competition with Slow Growth in Demand
Many Sub-Saharan African countries have a long history of exports of tropical tree crop prod-
ucts (cocoa from West Africa and coffee from several regions), as well as other traditional ex-
ports (cotton, tea, and tobacco). Aggregating from national level data reported by FAO (2006), 
we find that these traditional exports accounted for 60 percent of the total value of Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s agricultural exports. The five main traditional export crops provided Africa with an 
average of $5.6 billion in annual revenues over the last 25 years,1 a level about 40 percent higher 
than that in the 1970s. However, the world total export value of these five crops increased by 
120 percent in the same period, so that Africa’s market share fell from 22 percent in the 1970s 
to 14 percent in the 2000s. If African traditional exports had grown at the same rate as total 
world trade in these commodities, these traditional exports would have generated $8.8 billion 
in earnings each year to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, $3.2 billion more than actual earnings. 
A major reason for the slow growth in export earnings is the weak performance of coffee ex-
1All reported dollar figures are in US$.4   CHAPTER  2
ports. If the figures for coffee are excluded, 
export revenue of the other four crops rose 
by 120 percent between the 1970s and the 
2 000s ,  c o m p ar ed  w i th  an  in c r e a s e  o f  1 9 0 
percent in the world trade.
  Weak global demand for traditional ex-
port commodities, particularly for coffee, is 
one factor behind the poor performance of 
African agricultural exports. Ng and Yeats 
(2002), for example, argue that global de-
mand for the type of goods African coun-
tries produce has grown much more slowly 
than the growth in demand for other com-
modities. A study on economic development 
in Africa by the United Nations   Con    ference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2001) 
argues that a secular decline in African 
terms of trade since the early 1980s is re-
sponsible for the marginalization of the re-
gion in world trade. According to the esti-
mates of the UNCTAD study, the level of 
overall terms of trade for Africa at the end of 
the 1990s was 20 percent below that attained 
in the early 1970s. For the two largest Afri-
can export commodities, coffee and cocoa, 
the lowest world market prices in 2000–2002 
were only about 12 percent of the highest 
prices for coffee in the early 1990s and 27 
percent of the highest prices for cocoa in the 
early 1980s (Figure 2.1). Declines in coffee 
prices alone represented a total loss of about 
$4.5 billion (ICO 2006). Given that the unit 
value of nonagricultural products (for exam-
ple, manufactured goods) was rising during 
a similar period, the real prices for Africa’s 
traditional export commodities were further 
lowered from their nominal values.2 More-
over, the downward trend in relative prices of 
African export commodities was accompa-
nied by a high degree of volatility. A study 
by Akiyama et al. (2003) shows that African 
exports experienced approximately twice the 
volatility in terms of trade as East Asia from 
the 1970s to the 1990s and roughly four 
times that experienced by the industrial 
countries during the same period. 
Coffee
Coffee is produced in 40 Sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries, 20 of which are in East and 
Southern Africa (Table A1).3 The decline in 
green coffee prices is due mainly to an over-
supply in the global coffee market resulting 
from increases in world coffee production, 
which are driven primarily by increases in 
yield in many countries(Figure 2.2), in addi-
40
20












Figure 2.1  Monthly average prices for coffee and cocoa, 1980–2005
Source: ICO (2006) and ICCO (2006).
2According to Baffes (2003), world cotton price in 2002 was 50 percent of its 1980s level in nominal terms and 
40 percent in real terms.
3All table numbers including the letter A refer to the tables in Appendix A.AGRICULTURAL  EXPORT  MARKETS   5
tion to the area expansion in some countries. 
Owing to technological innovations that have 
resulted in high-yield varieties and better 
pest resistance, world average coffee yields 
grew by 5.5 percent a year between 1996 and 
2003 (Table 2.1, Part A). For example, yield 
increased dramatically after the introduction 
o f Caturra p lan ts in 1 996 in Co l ombia. In 
Brazil, coffee yield grew at 6.8 percent per 
year, and there was an increase of 6.6 percent 
per year for Latin America as a whole during 
this period (Table 2.1, Part C). The area ex-
pansion that occurred mainly in South and 
Southeast Asia (Table 2.1, Part D) has made 
a few countries in these regions major com-
petitors in the world coffee market. Vietnam, 
for example, has increased its market share 
from almost zero in the 1970s to more than 
10 percent today. Together with India and 
Indonesia, the share that Asian countries 
have gained in the world coffee market is al-
most equivalent to the share that African 
countries have lost (Table 2.1, Part E).
  In contrast, green coffee yields either 
declined or stagnated in the same period 
(1996–2003) in 25 of the 28 Sub-Saharan 
African countries for which the yield data 
are available. For Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole the coffee yield declined by an aver-
age annual rate of 0.3 percent during the 
s am e  pe ri od  (T a b l e  2. 1 ,  P art  B ).  A  cr o s s -
country yield comparison for different types 
of coffee shows even more dramatic changes.4 
Figure 2.3 compares the trends in robusta 
coffee yield in Côte d’Ivoire and Vietnam, 
and Figure 2.4 compares arabica coffee 
yields in Kenya, Tanzania, and Colombia. 
Only for the hard arabica group did yields in 
Ethiopia remain higher than in a major com-
peting country (Brazil) until 2001, although 
Brazilian yields seem to have a much higher 
growth rate (Figure 2.5). These yield com-
parisons suggest that declines in coffee pro-
duction efficiency is one major reason for 
Africa’s loss of market share.
  Moreover, in 24 Sub-Saharan African 
countries, harvested areas either declined or 
stagnated in this period.5 In total, Africa lost 
one-third of its coffee production area (an 
annual average decline of 3.2 percent; Table 
Figure 2.2  Coffee yield in Africa, Latin America, and Asia
0.4
0.3








South and Southeast Asia 0.9
Metric tons/hectare
Source: FAOSTAT (2006).
4International Coffee Organization has categorized coffee into four major groups: Colombian mild arabica, Bra-
zilian natural or hard arabica, other mild arabica, and robusta. Three types of coffee, Colombian mild arabica, 
hard arabica, and robusta, are produced in Africa. 
5Coffee production in Angola, one of the world’s largest coffee producers during the 1960s and early 1970s, fell 
to almost zero in the 1990s owing to civil war (Table A1). An outbreak of the coffee wilt disease is an important 
reason for the fall in Uganda’s coffee production (Baffes 2006).6   CHAPTER  2
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Figure 2.3  Robusta coffee yield in Côte d’Ivoire and Vietnam



























Figure 2.5  Hard arabica coffee yield in Ethiopia and BrazilAGRICULTURAL  EXPORT  MARKETS   7
2.1, Part B). With low productivity in coffee 
production Africa was less competitive in the 
world market. Among the 40 coffee-produc-
ing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 26 
listed in Table A1 had annual coffee export 
revenue of more than $100,000 in the early 
1970s. Today there are only four countries 
whose annual coffee exports are valued at 
more than $100,000. Among these four, only 
Ethiopia has a current annual coffee export 
revenue higher than it was in the 1970s, 
whereas revenues from coffee exports for the 
Table 2.1  Growth rate of coffee production and exports (annual average %)
  1970–79 1980–89 1990–95 1996–2003
A. World
Production growth rate 1.0 1.5 –2.0 6.3
Yield growth rate 0.5 0.2 0.6 5.5
Harvest area growth rate 0.5 1.3 –2.7 0.7
Export volume growth rate  0.3 2.2 –2.0 2.5
Export value (current prices) growth rate  20.3 0.4 13.2 –14.0
Share of coffee in world agricultural trade  5.3 4.4 2.2 2.1
B. Sub-Saharan Africa
Production growth rate –2.0 0.7 –2.9 –3.4
Yield growth rate –2.1 1.0 1.7 –0.3
Harvest area growth rate 0.1 –0.3 –4.5 –3.2
Export volume growth rate –1.0 0.2 –5.7 –5.5
Export value (current prices) growth rate 19.2 –1.6 9.0 –19.8
Share of coffee in Sub-Saharan Africa agricul-
tural trade value 
24.8 25.9 14.2 11.2
C. Latin America 
Production growth rate 1.6 1.4 –3.9 7.6
Yield growth rate 1.4 –0.2 –0.8 6.6
Harvest area growth rate 0.2 1.6 –3.1 0.9
Export volume growth rate –0.7 1.7 –3.4 2.9
Export value (current prices) growth rate 18.9 –0.1 11.0 –13.4
Share of coffee in Latin American agricultural 
trade value 
22.8 20.6 13.3 11.1
D. South and Southeast Asia
Production growth rate 5.7 3.7 5.7 10.1
Yield growth rate 1.3 –0.9 2.6 4.3
Harvest area growth rate 4.3 4.7 3.1 5.5
Export volume growth rate 8.9 6.2 3.1 7.1
Export value (current prices) growth rate 31.1 3.9 26.3 –13.4
Share of coffee in South and Southeast Asian 
agricultural trade value
3.9 5.2 3.6 3.3
E. Share in the world coffee market
Sub-Saharan Africa (%) 30.6 23.8 18.8 15.8
Latin America (%) 57.7 58.8 58.0 53.9
South and Southeast Asia (%) 6.8 11.9 16.2 22.0
Source: FAOSTAT (2006), last accessed in March 2006.8   CHAPTER  2
other three big coffee export countries, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Uganda, fell by 50–70 
percent from the levels in the early 1970s.
  According to FAO estimates, demand for 
coffee in developed countries (which con-
sume about 70 percent of the world’s coffee) 
is more or less constant with a low price elas-
ticity (around –0.2); that is, demand will in-
crease only marginally even if the price de-
clines substantially. Without considerable 
growth in demand, even a modest growth in 
Africa’s productivity (not to mention the con-
tinuing increase in coffee production in Latin 
America and Asia) may further depress world 
prices for green coffee.6 There is, however, a 
long-term prospect for growth in demand in 
less mature markets of Asia, Eastern Europe, 
South America, North America, and in do-
mestic markets of the producer countries 
themselves, where demand is highly income 
elastic. However, African countries have to 
compete with Asian and Latin American 
exporters for opportunities in these markets.
  Although the global market for green 
coffee is characterized by sluggish demand, 
a rapidly expanding market for high-quality 
and differentiated gourmet coffees in recent 
years appears to offer a better prospect. 
“Specialty” coffee products differentiated 
by superior variety and higher quality are 
sold at a significant price premium on the 
international market; Colombia’s Juan Val-
dez and 100% Colombian Coffee and Ja-
maica’s Blue Mountain Coffee, for example, 
are the most expensive coffees in the world. 
The success of these brands is attributed to 
high quality and effective marketing strate-
gies, but African countries have yet to de-
velop such specialty products.7
  There also remains a great potential for 
expanding the market for roast coffee. World 
export of roast coffee has been growing in 
t e r m s  o f  b o t h  v o l u m e  a n d  v a l u e .  I n  t h e  
1970s, the volume of world exports of roast 
coffee was equivalent to only 1.4 percent of 
that of green coffee. With an average annual 
6According to DECPG (2006) coffee prices in the world market fell by 5.7 percent in June 2006 on expectations 
of a large increase in Brazil’s crop for the 2006/07 season.
7Likewise, “Fair-Trade” coffee remains a niche market. Calo and Wise (2005) conclude that while fair trade coffee 
may have an important role to play in promoting sustainable livelihoods, neither this market nor national govern-
ment programs alone can substitute for “concerted international efforts to address the price crisis.” See also Bacon 
(2005). 
Table 2.2  World shares and growth rates of roast coffee exports (annual average %)
  1970–79 1980–89 1990–95 1996–2003
World roast coffee exports
As percent of green coffee exports  1.4 2.6 5.2 6.7
Growth rates  7.1 8.7 4.1 7.1
Shares in the world roast coffee market 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.5
Asia 1.3 2.0 4.0 2.1
Europe 62.5 75.6 79.1 77.8
North and Central America 35.3 19.6 12.7 18.1
Growth rates of roast coffee exports
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.0 36.7 0.4 –5.8
Asia 13.3 16.7 21.7 1.7
Europe 9.1 10.7 5.0 6.8
North and Central America 3.0 –2.4 3.5 9.4
Source: FAOSTAT (2006), last accessed in March 2006.AGRICULTURAL  EXPORT  MARKETS   9
growth rate of 8.2 percent, that ratio has 
now risen to 6.7 percent (Table 2.2). African 
countries started to increase roast coffee 
exports in the mid-1980s. However, owing 
to the extremely low level at which they 
began and a slowdown in growth in recent 
years, African countries currently account 
for less than 1 percent of world roast coffee 
exports (Table 2.2), equivalent to 1–2 per-
cent of their green coffee exports.
  Since world prices for roast coffee are 
about twice those for green coffee, African 
countries would be better off exploring mar-
ket opportunities for roast coffee and in-
creasing roast coffee exports. For example, if 
African countries could replace 15 percent 
of their current green coffee exports with 
roast coffee, assuming that the price ratio 
remains the same, it would be equivalent to 
an increase in coffee export revenue of 10 to 
15 percent and total agricultural export value 
of 2 percent. Nevertheless, the potential de-
pends crucially on how competitively Afri-
can countries can roast their green coffee 
maintaining high quality compared with 
other countries that export roast coffee.
Cocoa
Cocoa is produced primarily in West Af-
rica, but given its importance in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa’s total agricultural exports, we 
include it in this study and compare its 
trends with coffee. As opposed to the cur-
rent situation with coffee, West African 
countries as a whole have been able to keep 
their share of the world cocoa market at 
about 60 percent, approximately the same 
level as their historical high in the 1970s. 
World cocoa production and exports have 
both grown at an average rate of 3.4 and 3.7 
percent per year, respectively, in the last two 
decades, whereas West African cocoa pro-
duction and exports have grown at a rela-
tively faster pace, by 4.2 and 4.0 percent per 
year,   respectively (Table 2.3). However, 
world cocoa prices declined significantly in 
the late 1990s (see Figure 2.1), resulting in a 
decline in West African cocoa export reve-
nue during 1996–2003. With the new reve-
lations concerning the health benefits of 
cocoa consumption and the recovery in 
world cocoa prices after 2000, the value of 
Africa’s cocoa exports almost doubled be-
tween 2000 and 2003 (and fell slightly in 
2004). A few big cocoa-exporting countries 
in West Africa, including Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, and Nigeria, have benefited signifi-
cantly from the recent cocoa boom. How-
ever, even in these countries (except for 
Côte d’Ivoire), the recent cocoa export reve-
n u e s  a r e  j u s t  s l i g h t l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  r e -
corded historical highs of the late 1970s.  < < T a b l e   2 . 3   n e a r   h e r e > >
Table 2.3  Growth rate of cocoa production and exports (annual average %)
Region 1980–89 1990–2003 1980–2003
Sub-Saharan Africa
Production growth rate 5.0 3.7 4.2
Export volume growth rate 4.7 3.3 4.0
Export value growth rate  0.4 5.0 1.2
Share of cocoa in Sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural trade value  19.2 15.5 17.2
World
Production growth rate 4.4 2.1 3.4
Export volume growth rate 6.1 2.4 3.7
Export value at current prices growth rate  1.3 4.2 0.9
Share of cocoa in world agricultural trade value  1.1 0.6 0.6
Share of Sub-Saharan Africa in world cocoa market  64.9 64.0 61.1
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Cotton, Tea, and Tobacco
In contrast with a declining trend in African 
coffee production and exports and a stag-
nating growth pattern in cocoa export 
  revenue, African farmers as a whole have 
performed quite well in the other three tra-
ditional commodities in the last two de-
cades. During this period, the annual growth 
rates of production, export volume, and ex-
port revenue of African cotton, tea, and to-
bacco remained above the world average 
(Table 2.4). Although the decline in the 
world price for cotton in the late 1990s and 
first 2 years of the 2000s caused African 
cotton export revenues to fall, exports grew 
at 3.8 percent a year in volume and 2.7 per-
cent a year in absolute value between 1980 
and 2003. In contrast, the world cotton trade 
grew at 1.5 and 0.3 percent a year in volume 
and value, respectively, during the same pe-
riod. African tea production and exports 
also performed better than the world aver-
age, resulting in a growing share in the 
world tea export market (Table 2.4). Growth 
in African tobacco exports was also above 
the world average level, but stagnant world 
demand for tobacco started to constrain the 
growth of African tobacco exports.  < < T a b l e   2 . 4   n e a r   h e r e > >
  A l t h o u g h  S u b - S a h a r a n  A f r i c a  a s  a  
whole has generally been able to compete 
with other suppliers in cotton, tea, and to-
bacco export markets, subsidies in other 
countries, especially in several wealthy 
ones, have placed many African countries at 
a competitive disadvantage. According to 
the estimate of Townsend and Guitchounts 
(1994), more than two-thirds of the cotton 
produced in the world was grown in coun-
tries where there was some type of govern-
ment intervention. The International Cotton 
Advisory Committee (ICAC 2002) found 
that eight countries provided direct support 
for cotton production and that the level of 
direct production assistance during the five 
seasons between 1997/98 and 2001/02 
ranged between $3.8 and $5.3 billion. For 
200 1 /02  al o n e ,  direc t  as s i s tan ce  t o  c o tt o n 
producers in the United States reached $2.3 
billion, and $0.8 billion went toward subsi-
dies in Greece and Spain, the two major 
cotton-producing countries in the European 
Union (Baffes 2003). Market opportunities 
for African cotton and other traditional ex-
port crops would depend on the removal of 
such subsidies in other cotton-producing 
countries, especially the United States. Al-
though Africa has the potential to increase 
exports in a less price-distorted world cot-
ton market, competition from India, Brazil, 
and China may still constrain its market 
opportunities.
Reforms in the Traditional 
Agricultural Export Sector
Historically, production and marketing of 
traditional agricultural export commodities 
in most African countries has been govern-
ment controlled, with the support of quota 
or buffer stock programs organized through 
international commodity agreements. The 
collapse of international prices for coffee, 
cocoa, and tea in the late 1970s and early 
1980s made the quota and buffer stock pro-
grams unsustainable and signaled the end of 
those agreements. Moreover, the emphasis 
on market liberalization under the World 
Bank’s structural adjustment programs led 
to the elimination of price controls and mar-
keting boards for many traditional export 
commodities. By the end of the 1980s and 
into the early 1990s, the state monopolies in 
different African countries that implicitly 
taxed coffee and cocoa producers gave way 
to liberalization. In the case of cotton, pol-
icy approaches differed significantly be-
tween West and East Africa, owing to the 
very different economic and political condi-
tions in the two regions.
  In the prereform period, agricultural 
prices were typically severely depressed in 
many African countries, with negative pro-
tection often compounding the effect of 
overvalued exchange rates. Thus liberaliza-
ti on o f agricul tural prices w as a common 
feature of reform programs. In the wake of 
the reforms, with the assumption that well-
functioning agricultural markets existed or 1 2    C H A P T E R   2
would spring up quickly and automatically, 
improving overall economic efficiency was 
expected to increase producer prices rela-
tive to border and international prices as a 
result of increased competition among trad-
ers as well as lower taxes. Since a competi-
tive environment can stimulate investment 
and improve management, it was also pre-
dicted that transformation costs (for exam-
ple, processing, storage, and transportation) 
in agricultural commodity marketing would 
be lowered and margins of profitability in 
the various segments of the marketing chain 
(from the world market to the border, and 
from the border to the farmgate) would 
decline.
  Measures to improve markets and more 
generally to increase the elasticity of supply 
were totally neglected in the structural ad-
justment programs (Noman and Stiglitz 
2006). Moreover, as changes in world prices 
now impact on the domestic commodity 
markets more directly and quickly, there is 
the question of whether market reform leads 
to greater variability in export prices. Sev-
eral studies have attempted to test these 
predictions. Mundlak and Larson (1992) es-
timated price transmission elasticities of 
world to domestic markets for 58 countries 
and found that they were relatively low in 
the distorted domestic markets. Cardenas 
(1994), reaching a similar conclusion, noted 
that the fluctuations in world prices were 
found to fully transmit to producers where 
government intervention in pricing was lim-
ited (for example, in Costa Rica and Kenya). 
On the other hand, the findings by Quiroz 
and Soto (1995) differ substantially from 
these studies, as they found that the interna-
tional price signals were transmitted poorly 
to domestic markets or not transmitted at 
all. Using a similar method, Baffes and 
Gardner (2003) find that changes in world 
prices account for only a small share of the 
variation in domestic prices. They argue 
that it was persistent political impulse that 
insulated domestic markets from world 
c o m m o d i t y  m a r k e t s .  K r i v o n o s  ( 2 0 0 4 )  r e -
ports that in most countries the long-term 
share of producer prices in world market 
prices increased substantially after the re-
forms, especially in countries where the lib-
eralization was complete (for example, in 
Uganda, Brazil, and India).
  Unlike numerous studies concerning 
changes in spatial prices after the reforms, 
studies relating changes in price volatility 
following reforms are rare. Akiyama et al. 
(2003) calculated variability in producer 
prices for cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar 
in 35 African countries for 1986–90 and 
1991–95. Using FAO data, they found no 
evidence that price volatility increased 
between the two periods. Analyzing ag-
gregate data and distinguishing between 
volatility and uncertainty, Dehn (2000) 
found evidence that commodity price un-
certainty for African countries increased 
after 1973. However, he did not find any 
evidence that price uncertainty increased 
during 1986–97 compared to 1973–85. 
In  a one   country–one commodity study, 
Karanja (2002) found that price volatility 
in domestic coffee prices increased in 
Kenya following the reforms.
  Apart from the resulting changes in the 
level of absolute producer price and price 
volatility, there is a need to evaluate the im-
pact of agricultural commodity market re-
forms on the distribution of income and 
total surplus and on the structure of the 
market. It is observed that producers’ share 
in the world price increased in almost all of 
the African countries that undertook signif-
icant reform initiatives. For example, prices 
r e c e i v e d  b y  U g a n d a n  c o f f e e  p r o d u c e r s  
moved much closer to world prices after the 
reforms (Figure 2.6), and a similar situation 
is observed in the coffee sectors in Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Tanzania. In contrast, the mar-
gin between the world price and the price 
received by the robusta coffee producers in 
Côte d’Ivoire remained high, as the Ivorian 
coffee sector was not liberalized until 1998–
99 (Figure 2.7).   < < F i g u r e   2 . 6 .   2 . 6   n e a r   h e r e > >
  The differences in marketing costs and 
taxes are also reflected in the prices re-
c e i v e d  b y  p r o d u c e r s .  W h e n  t h e  f a r m g a t e  AGRICULTURAL EXPORT MARKETS      13
prices were set by the marketing boards or 
price stabilization funds, farmers had no al-
ternative outlet for their products, so the 
high marketing costs were easily passed on 
to the producers (Varangis and Schreiber 
2001). Table 2.5 shows that African cocoa 
producers in the countries where cocoa 
marketing and pricing systems were con-
trolled by state parastatals received much 
lower prices than the growers in countries 
with effective competition among buyers. In 
the wake of market reforms in 1998–99, 
producer prices in Côte d’Ivoire increased 
significantly. In Nigeria and Togo, producer 
prices increased from 20 percent and 60 
percent of the FOB prices prior to the re-
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forms to about 80 percent after (Varangis 
and Schreiber 2001). However, producers in 
Ghana continued to get lower prices, as 
cocoa marketing and pricing systems were 
still not completely liberalized.  < < T a b l e   2 . 5   n e a r   h e r e > >
  Market reforms have also been accom-
panied by an increasing concentration of the 
downstream chain in certain commodity 
markets such as coffee and cocoa.8 When 
millions of small producers in many low-
income countries face a very few multina-
tional companies that control the process-
ing, marketing, and retailing, the belief is 
that asymmetric market powers contribute 
to the dramatic decline in international 
prices for green coffee, since the retail cof-
fee prices declined only marginally (Krivo-
nos 2004; Muradian and Pelupessy 2005). 
As a result, the gap between producer and 
retail prices of coffee has increased over the 
last 15 years and most of the value added in 
the coffee supply chain has been captured 
by the multinational companies (Talbot 
1997). Analyzing the recent trends in the 
global coffee value chain, Ponte (2001) and 
Fitter and Kaplinsky (2001) conclude that 
even for the higher-quality and new variety 
coffees, the gains from product differentia-
Table 2.5  Cocoa producer price and producers’ share of world price 
  1991 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002
World price (U.S. cents/lb) 54.2 63.3 66.0 76.0 40.3 49.4 80.7
Brazil (reform year: 1990)
Producer price (U.S. cents/lb) 34.1 46.8 60.1 32.2 45.1 29.6
Producer’s share of world price (%) 53.8 70.9 79.1 80.0 91.3 36.7
Cameroon (reform year: 1995)
Producer price (U.S. cents/lb) 35.1 19.1 27.8 52.6 29.0 18.3 50.9
Producer’s share of world price (%) 64.7 30.2 42.1 69.1 72.1 37.1 63.1
Côte d’Ivoire (reform year: 1999)
Producer price (U.S. cents/lb) 35.1 26.8 27.8 34.8 23.5 42.2 47.9
Producer’s share of world price (%) 64.7 42.3 42.1 45.7 58.3 85.4 59.4
Ghana (reform year: 1993)
Producer price (U.S. cents/lb) 26.1 13.3 24.6 35.2 14.5 21.6 33.4
Producer’s share of world price (%) 48.1 21.0 37.3 46.3 36.0 43.7 41.4
Indonesia (reform year: 1997)
Producer price (U.S. cents/lb) 33.8 29.0 39.5 35.7 39.8 37.2 46.3
Producer’s share of world price (%) 62.3 45.9 59.8 46.9 98.8 75.3 57.4
Nigeriaa (reform year: 1987)
Producer price (U.S. cents/lb) 46.8 126.4 166.6 165.3 34.8 36.7 46.6
Producer’s share of world price (%) 86.4 199.6 252.3 217.5 86.4 74.4 57.8
Togo (reform year: 1996 )
Producer price (U.S. cents/lb) 43.9 25.5 39.1 50.1 24.8 47.6 59.2
Producer’s share of world price (%) 80.9 40.3 59.2 65.9 61.6 96.4 73.4
Source: Compiled from ICCO (2006) and FAOSTAT (2006), accessed July and March 2006, respectively.
aUnusual increase in producer prices in Nigeria during 1994–98 was a result of exchange control.
8Five multinational companies became dominant in retail coffee sales in major consuming countries after the 
mid-1980s and seven large trading companies gained control over a major portion of the green coffee imports 
(Talbot, 1995–96). In 1998, the top six importers (Neumann, Volcafe, Cargill, Esteve, Aron, and Man) ac-
counted for more than 50 percent of total global trade of green coffee, while the top two roasting and instant 
coffee manufacturing companies (Nestlé and Philip Morris) controlled 50 percent of the market (Ponte 2001).AGRICULTURAL EXPORT MARKETS      15
tion do not necessarily accrue to the produc-
ers, as the downstream of the supply chain 
is becoming increasingly concentrated.
  The market reforms in many African 
countries have also left small farmers with-
out access to credit, price and production risk 
management tools, new technology, and 
some inputs such as insecticides and fungi-
cides. This is an important factor for African 
small farmers unable to compete with large 
producers in Latin America or producers in 
Asia. Although unconventional production 
practices such as contract farming have been 
on the increase in the African traditional 
agricultural export sector, smallholders are 
often left behind as exporters prefer contract-
ing with a small number of larger producers 
to minimize transaction costs. An empirical 
study on the Tanzanian coffee subsector, for 
example, shows that small producers became 
more vulnerable to financial constraints after 
the withdrawal of government support pro-
grams (Temu and Winter-Nelson 2002). 
Moreover, small growers’ access to informa-
tion and technical assistance worsened after 
the reforms because of the decline in govern-
ment funds directed toward agricultural ex-
tension services (FAO 2000).
  In summary, agricultural market reforms 
in many African countries seem to have had 
four fundamental impacts on the traditional 
agri cul tural e xport sector . First, as pri v ate 
trading is allowed in the domestic market 
and export taxes are substantially lowered, 
prices received by producers in the export-
ing countries have increased, at least in 
terms of the producers’ share in export 
prices, and marketing margins have de-
clined. Second, as price stabilization is 
abandoned, fluctuations in world prices have 
been transmitted more directly to domestic 
markets, exposing producers to a potentially 
higher degree of price volatility. Third, a 
major portion of the income and surplus 
generated along the traditional commodity 
chain was transferred from the producing 
countries to the multinational companies, as 
the market power shifted from the former to 
the latter after the collapse of international 
commodity agreements and increased con-
c e n t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  d o w n s t r e a m  p a r t  o f  t h e  
marketing chain. Finally, in the wake of the 
w i t h d r a w a l  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  s u p p o r t  p r o -
grams, African smallholders are facing the 
risk of being driven out of the market.
  African countries’ postreform experi-
ence suggests that simply opening up of the 
markets or elimination of government con-
trols is not enough to bring about the desired 
growth of the traditional primary commod-
ity sector. In order to be able to compete in 
a free-market environment Africa has to 
develop domestic market institutions and 
local infrastructure that facilitate the efforts 
of small producers. Although there remains 
some scope for increasing exports of tradi-
tional agricultural commodities and recap-
turing part of the lost world market share, 
the potential is limited by an almost stag-
nant global demand. Under these circum-
stances, many policymakers and researchers 
emphasize the expansion of nontraditional 
agriculture as a viable means of agricultural 
diversification, rural employment genera-
tion, and foreign exchange earnings in Af-
rica. A few East African countries (for ex-
ample, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) have 
already started to diversify their agricultural 
exports, moving away from the traditional 
commodities, but the actual growth poten-
tial of Africa’s nontraditional agri  cultural 
exports has to be looked at very closely.
Nontraditional Exports
Nontraditional agricultural exports—com-
modities that are not part of conventional 
local production and are growing rapidly 
owing to newly discovered markets (Little 
and Dolan 1998; Ng and Yeats 2002; Singh 
2002)—include a long list of products that 
vary across African countries and markets.9 
9Some traditional export crops are considered as nontraditional in certain countries, such as cotton in Zambia.1 6    C H A P T E R   2
In this study, we focus on two broad groups: 
horticultural and fish and fishery products.10 
Horticultural exports include more than 100 
varieties of fresh and processed fruits, vege-
tables, cut flowers, and foliage, and exports 
of fish and fishery products comprise more 
than 20 species of fresh and processed fresh-
water and marine fish, cephalopods, crusta-
ceans, and mollusks.
  The destinations of the majority of 
African nontraditional commodities are the 
markets in developed countries, especially 
in Europe, where there is an increasing ten-
dency for consumers to change their diets in 
favor of low-fat, low-cholesterol foods. In-
creased demand for healthy foods—fish, 
fruits, and vegetables—has led to a growth 
in imports from developing countries, where 
conditions for increasing production are 
likely to be more favorable. African coun-
tries not only have a comparative advantage 
in producing many nontraditional commod-
ities, but they also have preferential access 
to the markets in developed countries, espe-
cially in Europe, under the trade agreements 
of the Lomé Convention of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). However, future pros-
pects of Africa’s nontraditional agricultural 
export sector also crucially depend on 
whether African countries can cope with 
various nontariff barriers, including product 
quality and health and sanitary standards, 
and their durability in the buyer-driven sup-
ply chain.
Fish and Fishery Products
Fish and fishery products are still Sub-
Saharan Africa’s most important nontradi-
tional agricultural exports. This subsector 
accounts for more than 15 percent of Afri-
c a ’ s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e x p o r t  v a l u e ,  i n c r e a s i n g  
from 2 percent in the 1970s and 5 percent in 
the 1980s. With per capita consumption of 
24 kilograms a year, the European Union is 
the largest market for fish in the world. 
Owing to a steady decline in its production 
o f  c a p t u r e d  f i s h  p r o d u c t s  s i n c e  t h e  l a t e  
1980s, the European Union has become in-
creasingly dependent on imports, of which 
50 percent are supplied by developing 
countries.
  Although some 75 to 85 percent of Afri-
c a n  f i s h  e x p o rt s  g o  t o  E U  m ar k e t s ,  s u c h  
exports account for less than 8 percent of 
the total EU fish imports. The long-term 
trend suggests that consumption of fishery 
products in the European Union will con-
tinue to increase as will its imports, so there 
is tremendous potential for African coun-
tries to increase fish exports with the ar-
rangement of duty-free access to the EU 
markets. However, the expansion of African 
fish exports is constrained by product spe-
cies and nontariff barriers. For example, 
Sub-Saharan African countries produce and 
export mainly warm water fish species, 
which account for more than 70 percent of 
African fish exports, whereas EU fish im-
ports are made up of primarily cold-water 
species. Crustacean products such as shrimp 
and prawns are the leading import group 
into the European Union, whereas their 
share in African fish exports is only 5 per-
cent (European Union 2004).
  Owing to the growing demand in the EU 
markets, there is opportunity for African 
countries to increase their exports of frozen, 
prepared, and preserved fish and processed 
fishery products, but nontariff barriers and 
changing supply channels are imposing con-
straints. Henson, Brouder, and Mitullah 
(2000) and Oyejide, Ogunkola, and Bankole 
(2000), for example, show that food safety 
requirements can easily act as barriers to 
fish trade. Exporting countries must qualify 
as “harmonized” or “provisionally harmo-
nized” countries in terms of sanitary mea-
sures in order to gain access to EU markets. 
Import bans owing to food safety concerns 
are common in the EU countries in the fish 
10We include fish as a nontraditional export category though it has been traditionally exported by some African 
countries.AGRICULTURAL EXPORT MARKETS      17
trade. For example, the European Union 
imposed three successive bans on fish im-
ports from East African countries between 
1997 and 2000, causing disastrous outcomes 
in their fish industry, which is heavily de-
pendent on the European market (Henson, 
Brouder, and Mitullah 2000).
  African fishery products also have to tra-
verse a complicated supply channel— African 
producers/processors, exporters, and Euro-
pean importers, end-product manufacturers, 
and retailers. Typically, the European im-
porters are in a better position to govern the 
supply chain than the African processors or 
exporters. Moreover, multiple retailers have 
increased their market power in recent years 
and have become interested in acquiring 
c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t s  d i r e c t l y  f r o m  o v e r s e a s  
suppliers. Although changes in the struc-
ture of the supply channel may offer oppor-
tunities for African fishery exporters to 
work more directly with other parties in the 
chain, the requirement of a smoothly oper-
ating cold chain with adequate logistics to 
ensure consistent delivery of high-quality 
products is creating new challenges for 
 African  exporters.
  There is also tremendous potential for 
increasing intraregional trade in fish and 
fishery products, which currently accounts 
for less than 10 percent of African fish 
exports. The region as a whole imports 
large quantities of fish and fishery prod-
ucts, equivalent to 50 percent of African 
fish   exports, and with the growth of re-
gional income this figure is expected to 
increase. African countries should be able 
to take   advantage of this intraregion ex -
port opportunity.
Horticultural Products
Developed countries have seen a substantial 
increase in consumer demand for horticul-
tural products during the last decade, and 
high costs of labor and heating for green-
houses have caused them to look for outside 
sources, particularly for out-of-season prod-
ucts. Tropical climates, counterseasonal 
patterns of production, and relative geo-
graphical proximity to Europe all give Afri-
can countries a comparative advantage in 
horticultural export (Islam 1990; Barrett et 
al. 1997). Several other factors have also 
contributed to the growth of the African 
horticultural export market. Trade agree-
ments such as the Lomé Convention give 
preferential treatment to African exports in 
the EU market (Singh 2002). Many African 
governments have adopted export promo-
tion policies by reforming their domestic 
markets and trade policies and improving 
the environment for private and interna-
tional investment. African countries also get 
technological and logistic support from their 
international counterparts for the produc-
tion and marketing of horticultural prod-
ucts. Several African countries have also 
developed regional economic cooperation 
to coordinate their business activities and 
share technical know-how, market informa-
tion, and human capital to increase their 
competitiveness. As a result of these various 
initiatives, several of them have seen very 
rapid growth in horticultural exports during 
the last decade.
Fruits and Vegetables. Fruits and vegeta-
bles accounted for 8 percent of African 
agricultural exports in 1996–2002 and 
ranked second in African nontraditional 
exports after fish and fishery products 
(Table 2.6). Apart from South Africa, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Tanzania are the major 
African exporters and together accounted 
for more than half of Sub-Saharan African 
total fruit and vegetable exports in the last 
two decades. Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, 
and Guinea-Bissau in West Africa, Uganda 
in East Africa, and Zambia in Southern 
Africa have also emerged as exporters of 
frui ts  an d  v e g e ta b l e s  in  r ec e n t  y e ar s  an d  
together they currently account for another 
20 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s fruit 
and vegetable exports.   <<Table 2.6 near here>>
  There is scope for many African coun-
tries to increase their share in the world’s 
fruit and vegetable export market, as the 8 
percent share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s total 1 8    C H A P T E R   2
agricultural exports is much lower than the 
16 percent share of the fruits and vegetables 
in world agricultural trade. If South Africa 
is excluded, Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole 
accounts for only 1 percent of world total 
fruit and vegetable exports, which is close to 
the market share for South Africa alone. 
The Kenyan experience suggests that Afri-
can countries have the potential to sub-
stantially increase their fruit and vegetable 
exports. Kenya’s earnings from fruit and 
vegetable exports have grown steadily from 
$13 million in 1970 to $68 million in 1980 
and to over $200 million in 2001. Signifi-
cant increases in yields owing to improved 
technology and inputs, market innovations 
by private entrepreneurs, foreign invest-
ment, and government assistance all played 
vital roles in this growth.
  Encouraged by the remarkable success 
of countries such as Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, 
other African countries with favorable cli-
mates have also launched programs for hor-
ticultural export crop development. Ghana, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have en-
tered aggressively into the European fresh 
produce market within the last few years 
with reasonable success. However, the entry 
of more competitors into the market opens 
up the possibility of lower average prices for 
some products and a decline in sales reve-
nues, although estimated elasticity of export 
revenues with respect to export volume for 
some fruit and vegetable commodities is 
much higher than that for the traditional ag-
ricultural exports (Hallam et al. 2004).
Cut Flowers and Foliage.  The world trade 
in cut flowers is characterized by a high 
degree of concentration by products, desti-
nations, and sources. Roses (47 percent) 
and carnations (20 percent) are the main 
products traded. Germany is the principal 
importer, followed by the United States, 
the Netherlands, and Japan. The Nether-
lands leads the world in importing cut 
flowers for the purpose of later reexporting 
them (70 percent of the country’s auctioned 
cut flower imports are reexported). Afri-
can countries are the principal suppliers 
outside of Europe to European markets, 
but intra-EU trade is still a dominant factor 
in the EU’s cut flower market.
  Cut flower exports from Africa to EU 
markets increased dramatically during the 
last decade. The value of cut flower and foli-
age exports from seven African countries 
(Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania, 
Table 2.6  Growth in fruit and vegetable production and exports (annual average %)
  1970–79 1980–89 1990–95 1996–2002
Sub-Saharan Africa
Production growth rate 1.6 2.5 2.1 1.5
Export volume growth rate 0.9 0.4 4.8 4.8
Export value growth rate 7.6 1.0 7.9 1.8
Share of fruits and vegetables in Africa 
agricultural export value 4.0 4.3 6.1 7.6
World
Production growth rate 2.6 2.9 3.9 4.3
Export volume growth rate 4.0 3.1 5.6 3.3
Export value growth rate 15.6 5.6 6.0 –0.9
Share of fruits and vegetables in Sub-Saharan 
  Africa agricultural export value 11.5 13.0 16.0 16.1
Share of Sub-Saharan Africa in world fruit 
and vegetable export value 2.0 1.2 0.9 1.2
Source: FAOSTAT (2006), last accessed in July 2006.AGRICULTURAL EXPORT MARKETS      19
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) increased 
from $104 million in 1994 to $355 million 
in 2003, accounting for almost 50 percent of 
extra-EU imports. At present, Kenya is the 
leading exporter of cut flowers and foliage 
to Europe (31 percent of extra-EU imports 
in 2003), and has managed to keep itself up 
to date with changing consumer preferences 
i n  t e r m s  o f  fl o w e r  v a r i e t i e s ,  a s s o r t m e n t s ,  
and colors. However, as the industry is 
highly dependent on a few varieties (roses, 
statice, and alstroemeria) for its profitabil-
ity, increased competitive pressures from 
other African countries have weakened 
Kenya’s position in the European market for 
c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t s  s u c h  a s  s t a n d a r d  c a r n a -
tions, once the dominant focus of its indus-
try (Thoen et al. 2001).
  T h e  K e n y a n  e x p e ri e n c e  w e l l  i l l u s t r a t e s  
the nature of the cut flower industry and the 
ever-changing challenges to maintaining in-
ternational competitiveness in the market. 
First and most importantly, the industry is 
dynamic and is unlikely to be influenced by 
public initiatives and government interven-
tions. The primary role of government should 
be facilitative.11 Second, the development of 
a competitive and sustainable cut flower in-
dustry requires coordination in several areas 
by the principal stakeholders: floricultural 
and supply chain training, development of 
environmental standards, standardization of 
packaging materials, cold-chain facility in-
vestment, collection and dissemination of 
market information, and fostering of floricul-
tural research and advisory services. Third, 
there is a need for further clarification and 
harmonization of environmental standards 
and regulations and effective communication 
of guidelines to growers and exporters. A 
joint public–  private initiative for technical 
support to help comply with such guidelines 
and regulations may be necessary.
Smallholders in Horticultural Production.  
Export horticulture is regarded as a vehicle 
for poverty reduction through the generation 
of income among smallholders, rural labor-
ers on large farms, and unskilled and semi-
skilled processing factory workers. Von 
Braun (1994) reports that production of ex-
port vegetables has created new employ-
ment opportunities, reduced the need to rely 
on uncertain off-farm employment, and in-
creased household income of the smallest 
Guatemalan farmers. A gross margin analy-
sis by Minot and Ngigi (2002) suggests that 
horticultural production can produce sub-
stantially higher returns per hectare than 
staple food crop production. Since about 60 
percent of the fruits and vegetables exported 
by Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya are produced by 
smallholders, they are the principal benefi-
ciaries of the resulting direct benefits. More-
over, the indirect benefits to the economy 
associated with horticultural exports—an 
increase in employment opportunities, insti-
tutional development, marketing efficiency 
in the domestic supply chain, and the multi-
p l i e r  e f f e c t  o f  e x p o rt  i n c o m e  fl o w  i n  t h e  
rural economy—are likely to be even greater 
than its direct effects. McCulloch and Ota 
( 2 0 0 2 )  f i n d  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  h o u s e h o l d s  i n -
volved in export horticulture are better off 
than nonhorticultural households, particu-
larly in rural areas, owing to the employ-
ment opportunities generated on farms 
owned by the major exporters and the ac-
cess to credit and extension services that 
they provide. Nonetheless, the production 
and marketing of horticultural commodities 
often entail far more risk for small farmers, 
as compared with the production and mar-
keting of grain.
  The studies referred to earlier indicate 
gains for smallholders’ involvement in hor-
ticultural exports, but the number of small 
farms producing horticultural crops has 
been declining steadily. For example, in the 
early 1990s the majority of fruits and vege-
tables for export were grown by smallhold-
ers in Kenya (Harris 1992, cited in Hum-
11Private sector initiative has been predominantly responsible for the emergence and growth of the Kenyan cut 
flower industry. The role of the Kenyan government has wavered between facilitation and constraint.2 0    C H A P T E R   2
phrey, McCulloch, and Ota 2004), but by 
the late 1990s that number had declined to 
18 percent (Singh 2002). Such a trend can 
be partially explained by the changing 
structure of horticultural supply chains in 
which exporters that are competing for a 
relatively small number of European super-
markets prefer to deal with a few large com-
mercial farms, buying in large quantities 
through long-term contracts. These inte-
grated supply chains are better able to coor-
dinate the air shipping, rapid transport, and 
cold chains needed to deliver highly perish-
able horticultural products to the markets.
  Although the share of smallholders in 
the newly developed supply chain seems to 
have declined, small growers compete fa-
vorably against large commercial firms in 
organic crop production and in the produc-
tion of the more labor-intensive crops that 
require the stacking and picking of individ-
ual pods (Collins 1995). At present, there is 
a significant unmet demand for organic 
produce in European markets that provides 
entry opportunities for smaller African ex-
porters (Dolan, Humphrey, and Harris-
  Pascal 1999). However, for smallholder op-
erations to be successful it is essential that 
there be a sufficient number of cooperating 
growers in close proximity, located in areas 
with good transportation facilities. More-
over, to include more smallholders in the 
export-oriented crop production requires 
that small farmers be provided with full in-
formation about the market, be given access 
to credit, and be educated regarding suitable 
production and quality-control techniques.
  Recently, the importance of horticul-
tural production in peri-urban areas has 
drawn considerable attention among re-
searchers and policymakers. Owing to short 
crop cycles, high labor input, and the small 
land area required for effective cultivation, 
peri-urban production of fruits and vegeta-
bles is particularly suitable for small-scale 
farming. Moreover, relative proximity to 
cities gives peri-urban horticultural settle-
ments marketing advantages in terms of 
transportation and transaction costs. How-
ever, the possibility of involving a large 
number of smallholders in such activity is 
constrained by changing land-use patterns 
that come in the wake of urban expansion 
and the overall sanitary standards com-
monly found in the peri-urban areas (Binns 
and Fereday 1996).
Summary
The share of exports in the world’s agricul-
tural GDP has been increasing over time, 
but the value of African agricultural exports 
shows a declining trend, owing primarily to 
a sharp reduction in revenues from the re-
gion’s traditional exports, which account for 
about 60 percent of Africa’s total agricul-
tural exports. Apart from facing an overall 
decreasing trend in world prices for these 
traditional commodities, many African 
countries have also suffered from declining 
terms of trade and substantial price instabil-
ity over the past two decades. In addition to 
the limited growth in global demand for 
these traditional agricultural commodities 
and increasing competition from other parts 
of the world, African countries are also 
constrained by low productivity, problems 
with quality control, and asymmetric agri-
cultural and trade policies of wealthy nations 
(especially production subsidies), which are 
the major reasons for Africa losing ground 
in the world marketplace. Despite African 
countries’ significant market reform initia-
tives, future growth prospects for the re-
gion’s traditional agricultural exports do not 
appear promising unless they can better 
their competitive position by improving 
productivity, product quality and variety, 
and marketing conditions.
  Tropical climate, counterseasonal pat-
terns of production, relative geographical 
proximity to European markets, and prefer-
ential access to the markets of developed 
countries give African countries a compara-
tive advantage in nontraditional agricultural 
exports, such as fishery products, fruits, 
vegetables, and cut flowers. For a long list of 
such commodities, demand constraints are AGRICULTURAL EXPORT MARKETS      21
not binding in the short to medium term, 
and there are more promising opportunities 
for growth. However, success in capturing 
the market depends crucially on whether 
Africa can survive in the altered supply 
chain that requires quality and consistency. 
A few African countries have successfully 
increased their nontraditional exports, but 
the magnitude of these export earnings is 
still small for Africa as a whole.
  African countries obviously need more 
diversified agricultural exports in order to 
reduce income risks from falling and unsta-
ble prices for traditional products. However, 
there remains the question as to whether 
nontraditional agricultural exports have sig-
nificant potential as an engine of gro wth. 
The question arises not only because the 
v o l u m e  o f  n o n t r a d i t i o n a l  e x p o rt s  i s  s m a l l  
relative to Africa’s total trade and agricul-
tural income, but also because of the rela-
tively weak linkages with domestic and re-
gional demand and, hence, with the activities 
and income growth of the greater part of the 
smallholders.22
1In this section East Africa includes Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Southern Africa includes 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. South Africa 
is considered separately from other Southern Africa countries because of its economic size and development 
level. Western Africa includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Repub-
lic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé 
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
CHAPTER 3
Prospects of Regional 
and Domestic Markets
U
nlike traditional and nontraditional agricultural exports, Sub-Saharan Africa’s domes-
tic demand and production of food crops and livestock products far exceeds interna-
tionally traded quantities. An average African household spends 50–70 percent of its 
income on food: the total value of food consumed is approximately $20 billion per year in East 
Africa and $12 billion in Southern Africa (excluding South Africa). Although only part of the 
food produced in the region is marketed, with the rest consumed on the farm, it still represents 
a large and growing market that should offer growth opportunities for African agriculture and 
farm income. In this chapter we assess the demand for food products in East and Southern 
Africa and explore regional market opportunities by examining whether there is potential to 
increase mutually beneficial agricultural trade across different countries and regions in 
Africa.
Food Demand in East and Southern Africa
Agroecological conditions vary tremendously across Africa, but most of the countries have 
large crop and livestock sectors. In East and Southern Africa, cereals (mainly maize and sor-
ghum in most countries) typically account for 40–50 percent of the area cultivated, whereas 
among West African countries root and tuber crops are as important as cereals.1  Given that 
trading volume of root and tuber crops is very small in East and Southern Africa, we focus on 
cereal crops to discuss regional and domestic market opportunities.
  Although economists and policymakers are concerned about oversupply of cereals and low 
producer prices in many parts of the world, most African countries, except for South Africa, have 
grain deficits. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole consumes (both directly and indirectly) 80 to 90 
million tons of cereals per year, 20 percent of which are imported (Table 3.1). Grain net imports 
account for 15 and 25 percent of domestic consumption in East and Southern Africa, respec-
tively, even though 40–50 percent of the regions’ cultivated land is allocated to these crops. This 
relatively large share of food imports is not primarily a result of food aid, as that has constituted PROSPECTS OF REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC MARKETS       23
a relatively small and now declining share of 
total consumption (Stevens 2003). Rather, 
commercial imports of food are now a major 
drain on foreign exchange resources in many 
of these countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the cost of grain imports is equivalent to two-
thirds of the revenues earned from the five 
leading traditional exports (cocoa, coffee, 
tea, tobacco, and cotton). Household level 
data show similar patterns. According to 
SIDA (2006), only about 10 percent of the 
households surveyed produced a marketable 
surplus of food, whereas more than half the 
h o u s e h o l d s  i n t e r v i e w e d  f a i l e d  t o  p r o d u c e  





















Maize 10.4 0.7 0.1 11.0 43.0 5.5
Rice (milled equivalent) 2.6 0.6 0.0 3.2 12.1 18.8
Wheat 2.0 3.2 0.1 5.1 19.5 60.8
Other coarse grains 11.1 0.2 0.1 11.2 43.0 0.9
Total cereals  26.1 4.7 0.3 30.5 117.6 14.4
Southern Africa, excluding South Africa 
Maize 5.9 1.2 0.2 6.9 111.1 14.5
Rice (milled equivalent) 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 5.0 40.0
Wheat 0.4 1.1 0.1 1.4 19.6 71.4
Other coarse grains 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.1 16.0 18.2
Total cereals 7.4 2.6 0.3 9.7 151.7 23.7
South Africa
Maize 9.0 0.4 0.9 8.5 188.9 –5.9
Rice (milled equivalent) 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 20.0 100.0
Wheat 2.2 0.6 0.2 2.6 57.8 15.4
Other coarse grains 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 8.9 –25.0
Total cereals 11.7 1.9 1.2 12.4 275.6 5.6
West Africa 
Maize 9.9 0.3 0.1 10.1 40.1 2.0
Rice (milled equivalent) 4.9 3.6 0.0 8.5 33.6 42.4
Wheat 0.1 4.0 0.1 4.0 15.9 97.5
Other coarse grains 22.8 0.3 0.0 23.1 93.3 1.3
Total cereals 37.7 8.2 0.2 45.7 182.9 17.5
Sub-Saharan Africa,  excluding South Africa 
Maize 26.2 2.2 0.4 28.0 49.4 6.4
Rice (milled equivalent) 7.8 4.4 0.0 12.2 20.3 36.1
Wheat 2.5 8.3 0.3 10.5 17.8 76.2
Other coarse grains 34.8 0.7 0.1 35.4 60.6 1.7
Total cereals 71.2 15.5 0.8 85.9 148.1 17.1
Source: FAOSTAT (2006), last accessed in March 2006.2 4    C H A P T E R   3
enough food to cover their own needs and are 
therefore net buyers of basic food items.2  < < T a b l e   3 . 1   n e a r   h e r e > >
  Consumption of livestock products ac-
counts for 10–15 percent of African house-
holds’ spending, but growth here is expected 
to be rapid, especially in poultry because of 
increased urbanization and per capita in-
come. Currently, although Sub-Saharan Af-
rica produces more than 6 million tons of 
meat and 16 million tons of milk, imports 
still account for 13 percent of total avail-
ability. For example, imports supply 17 per-
cent of the poultry and 10 percent of the 
milk consumed in the region. The import 
share is particularly high in countries with 
rapid economic growth, such as Ghana and 
Uganda.
  Growth in population and per capita 
food demand implies that food demand in 
the region is likely to increase considerably 
in the coming decade. According to a pro-
jection by FAO, Africa’s population will in-
crease from the 3-year average for 1997–
1999 of 574 million to 883 million in 2015, 
with a growth rate of 2.6 percent per year 
(F AO 2002). During the same period, per 
capita GDP is expected to increase by 1.8 
percent per year.3 As a result, aggregate Af-
rican demand for agricultural products will 
increase by 2.9 percent per year. In particu-
lar, according to the FAO projection, Afri-
ca’s total demand for cereals will increase to 
139 million metric tons by 2015, which is 62 
percent higher than the average demand 
level between 1997 and 1999. Among the 
cereals, demand for maize alone will in-
crease to 46 million tons by 2015, some 70 
percent more than the current level. Accord-
ing to the same projection, demand for oil-
seeds and vegetable oils, meat, and dairy 
products will increase by 3.3, 3.4, and 2.9 
percent per year, respectively.
  IFPRI’s IMPACT model projection sug-
gests similar trends. Driven by population 
growth and urbanization, with a per capita 
income growth rate of 1 percent, a “busi-
ness-as-usual” scenario in the model pre-
dicts that by 2020 Africa’s total cereal de-
mand is expected to be more than 50 percent 
higher and meat demand to be doubled from 
their current levels (Rosegrant et al. 2001). 
If the per capita income growth rate could 
be doubled—the rate required for achieving 
millennium development goals of halving 
the poverty and reducing hunger in Af-
r i c a — t h e  r e g i o n ’ s  d e m a n d  f o r  l i v e s t o c k  
products would triple by 2020, given that 
the income elasticity of demand for live-
stock is high.
  Although demand for cereals may not 
grow as fast as demand for livestock (since 
i t  i s  ty p i c al l y  m o r e  i n c o m e  i n e l a s t i c  th an  
livestock demand), increased feed demand 
will create market opportunities for maize 
and other coarse grains. According to the 
Chinese experience, a 2.5–3.0 of feed-to-
meat ratio is needed for rapid development 
in the poultry industry. If Africa were to 
double its poultry production in the next 10 
years (a 6 percent annual growth rate), feed 
grain demand would likewise rapidly in-
crease. For example, if 30 percent of poultry 
products are produced using feed-grain-
intensive production systems, feed demand 
by the poultry industry alone would be 1.5 
to 2 million tons annually. There are also 
huge market opportunities for many staple 
crops and livestock products within Africa. 
Thus, growth in African agriculture and 
farmers’ incomes could accelerate sharply if 
African agriculture becomes more competi-
tive in its own regional and domestic mar-
kets (even if it is unable to compete in inter-
national markets for food products).
2The case studies of SIDA (2006) have been undertaken in eight African countries: Ethiopia, Ghana,   Kenya, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The village survey covered 3,000 smallholders in 103 
villages.
3According to a World Bank study, per capita income in Africa as a whole will grow at 1.3 percent per year in 
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Exploring Regional Market 
Opportunities
Although national food demand is likely to 
grow rapidly in many countries and thus 
provide the most important marketing op-
portunities, a purely national perspective 
may not be the best one for agricultural 
growth strategies. Greater economic gains 
can be realized for groups of countries in 
various regions in Africa by improving 
marketing channels and coordinating them 
across borders. Through more integrated 
and competitive markets, individual coun-
tries can also specialize in the products in 
which they have a comparative advantage, 
thereby improving economic efficiency and 
unleashing regional growth dynamics.
  Official statistics indicate that intrare-
gional trade in Sub-Saharan Africa is mini-
mal—only $2.0 billion per year (for details 
see Tables A2 and A5 for Sub-Saharan 
  African exports and imports, and Tables 
A3, A4, A6, and A7, respectively, for East 
and Southern African exports and imports). 
Yet, there are striking differences in avail-
able resources among countries within Af-
rica—more so than in most other areas—
suggesting a potential for sizable regional 
trade. For example, countries with abundant 
land and scarce labor neighbor with others 
with abundant labor and scarce land. The 
presence of South Africa and other middle-
income countries in Southern Africa pro-
vides the region with a unique opportunity 
to further exploit agricultural potential and 
regional trade through regional dynamics 
and integration (Nin Pratt and Diao 2006).
  To help understand the potential intra-
regional demand among African countries, 
we examine the differences in comparative 
advantage across countries. As data on in-
traregional agricultural trade flows for food 
staples often significantly underreport ac-
tual trade, we compare instead indicators of 
“revealed” comparative advantage across 
countries. By matching commodities in the 
region for which some countries have a 
comparative advantage to export and others 
a comparative disadvantage (and have to 
import), we can get an indication of the po-
tential for increases in regional trade where 
little is currently taking place (at least as in-
dicated in the official statistics).
  To begin with, we calculate a statistical 
indicator called the “revealed” compara-
tive advantage (RCA), defined as the dif-
ference between a country’s share of com-
modity i’s exports and imports relative to 
the share of this commodity in the world 



















are the shares of commod-
ity  i’s exports and imports in a country’s 







is the share of commodity i’s trade in 
world total trade (since world exports equal 
imports for each commodity). A country is 
said to have a comparative advantage (dis-
advantage) in commodity i if the value of 
RCAi is positive (negative; Balassa 1965).4 
Note, though, that this measure ignores any 
trade policy distortions that affect trade 
flows. The calculated RCA indices show 
that African countries have different com-
parative advantages in a wide range of di-
versified agricultural commodities. At five-
digit SITC classification, there are more 
than 200 agricultural commodities in which 
there are only one to three relatively large 
exporting countries that have a strong com-
4We use five-digit SITC trade data drawn from the United Nations COMTRADE database for the calculation of 
RCA. The database includes 33 African countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Af-
rica, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Diao and Yanoma (2003) for the 
calculation of RCA in detail.2 6    C H A P T E R   3
parative advantage (in the relevant time pe-
riod 1990–2000).5
  We then look at the match between the 
commodities in which exporting countries 
have a strong comparative advantage and 
those imported by other countries in the re-
gion. We utilize two commodity lists—one 
in which the RCA values are high and posi-
tive (greater than 4.0) for the large export-
ers, and the other in which the RCA values 
are low and negative (less than –4.0) for the 
large importers—to estimate the correlation 
between the two groups of products. As in 
any other correlation analysis, the coeffi-
cient values lie between –1.0 and +1.0, and 
a value close to unity implies that the two 
commodity groups, exportables and import-
ables, are highly correlated. If exportable 
commodities are quite different from im-
portable ones, the correlation coefficient 
would be significantly less than unity or 
perhaps even negative.
  Table 3.2 presents the results of this 
analysis for 1990–95 and 1996–2000. In the 
pe ri od  fr o m  1 990  t o  1 99 5  s o m e  8 3  c o m -
modities appear in both the export and im-
port lists; this number accounts for slightly 
less than one-third of the commodities (260) 
in which at least one large exporting coun-
try has strong comparative advantage (with 
a high and positive RCA value) and less 
than half of the commodities (198) in which 
at least one large importing country has 
strong comparative disadvantage (with a 
low and negative RCA value). The esti-
mated correlation coefficient between the 
lists for exports (260) and imports (198) is 
0.595. From 1996 to 2000, the number of 
commodities that appear in both lists and 
the value of correlation coefficient both in-
crease (Table 3.2, first column). < < T a b l e   3 . 2   n e a r   h e r e > >
  These results indicate a potential for 
strengthening mutually beneficial agricul-
tural trade in Africa. Moreover, the appar-
5We define those countries, including South Africa, with more than 2 percent of total African agricultural 
exports (imports) or more than 10 percent of intraregional exports (imports) in 1996–2000 as large exporting 
(importing) countries.
Table 3.2    Correlation between exportables and importables for the major trading 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa





    RCA index > 4.0 260 58 38
    RCA index < –4.0 198 63 17
Number of commodities appearing in both 83 28 7
Correlation coefficient 0.595a 0.341a –0.135a
1996–2000
Number of commodities 299 61 43
    RCA index > 4.0 212 69 20
    RCA index < –4.0
Number of commodities appearing in both 97 29 9
Correlation coefficient 0.624a 0.629a 0.078
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from UNCOMTRADE 2005, last accessed in April 2005.
aCorrelation is significant at 99% (two-tailed) run by SPSS.PROSPECTS OF REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC MARKETS       27
ently slightly increased value of the coeffi-
cient and increased number of commodities 
appearing on both lists in the second period 
s ee m  t o  s h o w  an  in cr e as ed  tr e n d  in  s u c h 
potential.
  Results regarding the potential in in-
traregional trade of staple foods are likewise 
encouraging. As discussed earlier, official 
data indicate that intraregional trade in these 
commodities is limited at present, with most 
imports of food staples coming from outside 
the region. In the first period, there are 58 
staple commodities for which the RCA 
value is high and 63 staple commodities for 
which it is low. These commodities include 
livestock and livestock products, fishery, 
cereals, roots and tubers, pulses, and oil-
seeds. Twenty-eight staple commodities ap-
pear in both lists. The correlation coefficient 
of the exportable and importable staple 
commodities in the first period is 0.341. In 
the second period, the number of commodi-
ties that appear in the exportable (import-
able) lists increases to 61 (69), with 29 ap-
pearing in both lists. The value of the 
estimated correlation coefficient rises to 
0.629, almost double its value in the first 
period (Table 3.2, second column). This re-
sult indicates that foodstuffs are among the 
most dynamic products in potential intra-
African trade. Our findings are supported 
by Yeats (1998), who reports that feedstuff 
accounts for the fastest growing products in 
intraregional trade.
  Our findings are also supported by the 
recent evolution of regional trade, especially 
in Southern Africa. According to Nin Pratt 
and Diao (2006), regional trade in Southern 
Africa has expanded significantly in the last 
10 years, and the growth rate of intrare-
gional agricultural trade was almost twice 
that of the total of agricultural exports of the 
region, though starting from a smaller base. 
Such expansion of regional trade is associ-
ated with South Africa’s increasing involve-
ment since the country was readmitted to 
the global economy community in 1994. 
Since then, South Africa has been an active 
player in Southern Africa’s commodity and 
capital markets, as 25 percent of the region’s 
total foreign direct investments are from 
South Africa and 75 percent of its export 
expansion can be accounted for by increased 
exports from South Africa.
  We further checked whether there is a 
correlation of revealed comparative advan-
tage for trade in fruits and vegetables. We 
find that the estimated correlation coeffi-
cient is negative (–0.14) in the first period 
and becomes positive but small (0.08) in the 
second period (Table 3.2, third column), but 
the estimates are not statistically significant 
in either period. This outcome seems to 
show that there is a poor match in fruit and 
vegetable trade between intra-African ex-
ports and imports and that the most promis-
ing opportunities for rapid growth of non-
traditional exports is outside the region. 
Nonetheless, even though countries within 
Africa are mainly competitors in this trade, 
regional linkages may come through tech-
nological spillover and learning from each 
other.
Constraints to Exploring 
Market Opportunities
Improving competitiveness of agricultural 
products in international, regional, and do-
mestic markets is the key to expanding 
market opportunities. As outlined earlier, 
there is great potential for African agricul-
tural products, especially in the regional 
and domestic markets, but Africa’s agricul-
tural products are often not competitive. 
Low productivity, high transportation and 
marketing costs, various formal and infor-
mal trade barriers (both physical and insti-
tutional), and inconsistencies in trade and 
agricultural policies among African coun-
tries all contribute to the lack of market 
competitiveness. In order to be more com-
petitive, the region must increase overall 
agricultural productivity, reform infrastruc-
ture and institutions to reduce transporta-
tion and transaction costs, reform policies to 
encourage agricultural trade among the 
countries in the region, and enhance re-2 8    C H A P T E R   3
gional cooperation to open European and 
American markets by removing asymmet-
ric agricultural and trade policies.
  The case of maize provides one exam-
ple of the extent of relative competitive-
ness of African agricultural products in 
the world and regional markets. As shown 
in Table 3.3, the ratio of annual average 
wholesale to import parity prices for 
maize in the international market in this 
group of countries was greater than one, 
indicating that they are not competitive in 
the international maize market.6 However, 
some African countries may have relative 
competitiveness in regional markets. Sig-
nificant price differentials among African 
countries seem to suggest potential for in-
traregional maize trade, particularly in 
years of short supply (Dréze and Sen 1989; 
Dorosh 2001). Nonetheless, in some years, 
grain from outside the region may be less 
costly than imports from neighbors, as in 
Kenya and Uganda from 1997 to 2000 (Fig-
ure 3.1).  < < T a b l e   3 . 3   F i g u r e   3 . 1 > >
  Improvements in agricultural productiv-
ity, though important, are not likely to make 
agricultural products competitive in interna-
tional markets without substantial reduc-
tions in transport and marketing costs. 
Transport, communication, and marketing 
infrastructure in Africa are rudimentary, 
even by historical standards compared with 
other developing countries. For example, in 
the early 1990s Sub-Saharan Africa had 
about one-sixth of the rural road density of 
India in 1950. Poor infrastructure and poorly 
functioning domestic and regional markets 
add enormous transportation and marketing 
costs to production costs and squeeze Afri-
can traders and farmers out of their domes-
tic and regional markets. It is not uncom-
mon for African farmers to receive only 10 
to 20 percent of the price share from the 
products they sell with the rest—80 to 90 
percent—being the costs of transportation 
and marketing.
  Many African countries have under-
taken market reforms in recent years. 
Table 3.3  Ratio of wholesale maize prices to import parity price, 1994–2002
  Uganda Kenya Zambia  Mozambique Tanzania
1994 1.23 1.5 0.91
1995 0.88 1.03 1.01 1.07
1996 1.04 0.88 0.75 1.04
1997 1.96 1.64 0.93 1.44
1998 1.54 1.37 1.03 1.9 1.5
1999 1.36 1.58 0.89 1.18 2.02
2000 1.08 1.68 1.35
2001 1.52 1.67
2002    2.82 2.02  
Source: Authors’ calculations, using data from various sources.
6The import price is the U.S. FOB yellow maize price plus $45.4 per ton in shipping and other marketing costs 
to South Africa’s ports. This price also gives an approximation of import parity in other ports in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Given additional transport and marketing costs required to bring maize from wholesale markets in the 
sample countries to ports, the figures show that domestically produced maize is generally not competitive with 
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These reforms are a solid beginning but 
are not yet sufficient to generate greater 
supply response and competitiveness in 
the export, domestic, and regional mar-
k e t s  ( K h e r a l l a h  e t  a l .  2 0 0 2 ) .  A l t h o u g h  
market liberalization may have removed 
price distortions, reduced marketing mar-
gins, and improved market integration, a 
recent study by SIDA (2006) shows that 
only large commercial farmers in Africa 
have found opportunities to diversify, 
whereas smallholders have been progres-
sively marginalized from, rather than in-
tegrated into, the liberalized market. Ag-
r i c u l t u r a l  m a r k e t s ,  b o t h  f o r  i n p u t s  a n d  
outputs, remain underdeveloped. Small-
scale farmers in food crop production, es-
pecially those living far from roads and 
markets, are not only unable to benefit 
from the liberalization, but may no longer 
be able to afford chemical fertilizer owing 
to increased input prices. In the domestic 
and regional food product markets, such 
as those for cereal and livestock products, 
the role of market institutions in support-
ing exchange is especially weak. Public 
policies often hinder the informal trade 
and small-scale traders who are playing 
critical roles in the regional and domestic 
markets. Marketing margins for staple 
food trade are high and farmers’ share in 
the final prices is low, but value added to 
traders is often barely beyond transport 
costs.
  It is urgent for African countries to 
design appropriate market development 
policies to address these issues. Gabre-
Madhin (2001), for example, studied 
  market institutions, transaction costs, and 
  social capital in the Ethiopian grain mar-
ket and suggested three areas of policy 
intervention that are relevant to other Af-
rican countries’ grain and other staple 
food markets in which small traders play 
a dominant role. They include strengthen-
ing institutions responsible for standards, 
quality control, credit and other financial 
supports; contract enforcement; and mar-
ket information dissemination. The case 
studies by Minot and Ngigi (2003) on the 
Kenyan horticultural sector show that 
through various self-help growers’ groups, 
collective marketing helps small farmers 
make contractual market arrangements 
that offer a more reliable market outlet, 
allows them to obtain the seed on credit, 
and provides them with other production 
advice. 
Figure 3.1  Maize wholesale prices in Uganda and Kenya and import parity price
50












Source: Authors’ calculation using data from various sources.3 0    C H A P T E R   3
  In the growing competitive export and 
domestic markets, African farmers also 
need instruments to help them manage price 
and market risks, such as efficient, targeted 
safety-net programs and market-based risk-
management vehicles, for example, weather 
insurance and futures price contracts (Skees, 
Hazell, and Miranda 1999). At the same 
time, for farmers to become better inte-
grated into today’s increasingly competitive 
markets, they must acquire the technologies 
they need to improve quality and posthar-
vest storage and processing.
  Agricultural commodity flows in Africa 
are also severely hampered by both formal 
and informal intraregional trade barriers. 
Without better regional integration through 
lowering and removal of these barriers be-
tween one African country and another, 
harmonization of regulations to promote 
cross-border investment, and creation of in-
stitutional frameworks such as the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the Southern Africa Develop-
ment Community (SADC), and the South-
ern Africa Custom Union (SACU) to encour-
age free movement of people, commodities, 
and capital, improvement in transportation 
conditions within a country may not neces-
sarily increase intraregional trade and may 
actually lead to an increase in extraregional 
imports. 
  South Africa is a potential market for its 
neighbors’ agricultural exports and they, in 
turn, represent a potentially large market for 
South Africa’s nonagricultural and high-
v a l u e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  e x p o r t s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  
high tariffs imposed by South Africa on 
imported dairy products and cereals and 
those imposed by the low-income Southern 
African countries on imports of textiles, 
fruits, vegetables, and processed food pre-
cuts from South Africa hinder the develop-
ment of an integrated regional market. In-
creasing agricultural trade within Africa is 
also constrained by the trade barriers and 
agricultural policies in developed countries, 
as many of them, such as countries in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), are the main 
players in the world market. Most OECD 
countries have traditionally afforded heavy 
protection for their agricultural sectors, 
partly through policies granting domestic 
support (for example, input subsidies) and 
partly through trade policies such as tariffs, 
quotas, export subsidies, and seasonal im-
port restrictions. These policies not only 
make African agricultural products uncom-
peti ti v e in OECD markets, bu t impact on 
the domestic and regional markets in Africa 
as well. Many studies show that policies 
pursued by a small number of OECD coun-
tries cause most of the distortions in world 
agricultural markets (see, for example, Bur-
fisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder 2002; 
Diao, Roe, and Somwaru 2002). By decom-
posing the possible increase in world prices 
owing to worldwide agricultural trade liber-
alization, Diao, Roe, and Somwaru (2002) 
f i n d  t h a t  r e m o v i n g  d o m e s t i c  a n d  e x p o r t  
subsidies for agriculture in more developed 
countries, especially in the European Union 
and the United States, would account for 
about 80 percent of the possible increase in 
world agricultural prices after worldwide 
agricultural liberalization. Research at IFPRI 
suggests that global agricultural trade liber-
alization would benefit the whole of Africa 
by at least $5 billion per year (Diao and 
Yanoma 2003), and this figure does not take 
into account the potential gains from future 
agricultural investment stimulated by better 
prices for farmers.
Summary
In contrast to most traditional and nontradi-
tional agricultural exports, domestic de-
mand and production of food crops and 
livestock products far exceed internation-
ally traded quantities in Sub-Saharan Af-
r i c a .  S u p p l y  o f  m a n y  s t a p l e  c o m m o d i t i e s  
cannot meet the current demand, and 20 
percent of the region’s demand for food 
grains such as maize, rice, and wheat is met 
by imports from abroad. Displacing some of 
these food imports with domestic supply PROSPECTS OF REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC MARKETS       31
could have an enormous impact on overall 
African farm income and agricultural 
growth in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
total food demand is projected to further 
increase considerably in the next 1 0 years 
(for example, cereal demand will be 60 per-
c e n t  h i g h e r  t h a n  c u r r e n t  l e v e l s ) .  E x i s t i n g  
and growing food demand in the region of-
fers great potential for significant expansion 
of markets for many commonly grown ce-
real, root, tuber, pulse, oilseed, and live-
stock products. Nevertheless, the challenge 
is to satisfy current and future food demand 
in Afri ca wi th domesti c and re gi onal pro-
duction rather than by imports from abroad.
  The regional comparative advantage 
analysis shows that many African countries 
import a long list of agricultural commodi-
ties from outside the region, even though 
their regional neighbors have comparative 
advantages in producing them. In particular, 
the analysis shows that the greatest growth 
potential in intraregional trade lies with 
food staples. However, actual intraregional 
trade of food staples is at only a small frac-
tion of its potential as African products fail 
to compete with subsidized low-cost food 
imports from wealthy exporting countries. 
Apart from the asymmetric agricultural and 
trade policies in developed countries, low 
productivity, high transportation and mar-
keting costs, trade restrictions, and domestic 
pricing policies in African countries are 
major constraints for intraregional trade.
  There is scope for integrating and ex-
panding domestic and regional markets for 
a range of key commodities, but to explore 
the opportunities, African countries have to 
improve their competitiveness in agricul-
tural production and marketing. The region 
as a whole must increase overall agricul-
tural productivity, reform infrastructure 
and institutions to reduce transportation 
and transaction costs, reform policies to 
encourage intraregional agricultural trade, 
and enhance regional cooperation to put 
political pressure on developed countries 
(primarily in Europe and North America) to 
remove asymmetric agricultural and trade 
policies (in particular, domestic and ex-
port subsidies).
  Given prevailing world agricultural 
trade policies and poorly functioning mar-
kets within Africa, rapid increases in agri-
cultural production might lead to price de-
clines in the short run. However, in the long 
run, efforts to reduce marketing (transporta-
tion and transaction) costs can go a long 
way toward reducing consumer food prices 
while raising producer incomes. By invest-
ing in infrastructure and institutions, Afri-
can countries can maximize the positive 
linkage effects of growth in farm and non-
farm products. Over time, these linkages 
will significantly increase gains in overall 
incomes and calorie consumption, loosen-
ing the grip of hunger on the African 
continent.32
CHAPTER 4
Economywide Analysis of Agricultural 
Growth Opportunities
I
n this chapter we employ a world general equilibrium model to assess three broad alterna-
tive agricultural development strategies (promoting traditional export, nontraditional ex-
port, and food staples) in East and Southern Africa for overall economic growth. The po-
tential for investment and higher productivity in agriculture to increase income and food 
consumption depends on the diverse economic structures across countries, the initial size of 
the sector, the magnitude of the change in the sector’s productivity, and the structure of pro-
duction and demand within each country. There are also potentially important linkages across 
sectors and countries through changes in relative prices, including changes in the real ex-
change rate, and adjustment in resource allocation at sector and country levels. Our analysis 
focuses mainly on demand-side constraints. The simulations assume exogenous technological 
change in the production of various crops which results in increases in exports of traditional 
and nontraditional agricultural products, changing real market prices, total farm income, and 
national income.
Methodology
Our analysis of alternative growth scenarios for African agriculture focuses on East and 
Southern Africa. The world general equilibrium model developed for the analysis includes 
nine countries in East and Southern Africa: Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Republic of South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, as well as two aggre-
gate subregions, the Southern African Custom Union (SACU)1 and the rest of Southern Af-
rica. West Africa is aggregated into a region called “the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa region.”2 
The rest of the world is modeled as ten other countries/regions.3 Our study focuses on the 
seven low-income countries in East and Southern Africa. Table A8 highlights the economic 
structure of these seven countries, which provides the initial conditions for the modeling 
analysis.
  We model 34 production sectors, 23 of which are agricultural or agriculture-related (see 
Table B1 for commodity/sector details). Commodities produced by production sectors are ei-
1SACU member countries are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
2Data are from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database version 6 (2005) for 2001. Individual West 
African countries are not listed in the database, which precludes a disaggregated analysis. Similarly, because 
Kenya is not shown as a separate country, but is included in the “rest of the Sub-Saharan Africa” region, we are 
unable to present country-specific results for Kenya.
3The other countries/regions specified can be found in Table B1.ECONOMYWIDE ANALYSIS OF GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES       33
t h e r  s o l d  t o  t h e  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t s  o r  e x -
p o r t e d  t o  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s / r e g i o n s .  W o r l d  
prices adjust to clear world export/import 
markets for each commodity. International 
trade is traced by import destination and 
export sources; that is, the bilateral and 
multilateral trade flows among countries/
regions, rather than net trade or aggregate 
exports and imports, are included in the 
model. Thus, both intra-African regional 
and interregional trade (for the nine coun-
tries included in the model) is taken into 
account.
  Production technology is represented by 
fixed input-output coefficients for interme-
diate goods (such as fertilizers) and a con-
stant elasticity substitution (CES) function 
for primary inputs: two types of labor 
(skilled and unskilled), land, other natural 
resources, and capital. These production 
technologies vary across sectors and coun-
tries, to capture the differential initial eco-
nomic structure specified in the base social 
accounting matrices for the countries/ 
 regions in the model.
  Consumer income levels are determined 
as the sum of factor incomes less direct 
taxes. Consumption demand is modeled as a 
linear expenditure system (LES) demand 
function for each commodity. The income 
elasticities used to derive the marginal bud-
get shares for consumption are from Reimer 
and Hertel (2004), in which, for example, 
income elasticity of demand for grain is 
0.4–0.5 for the low-income African coun-
tries. We assume a single Frisch parameter 
for each individual country/region.4 The 
price elasticities for grain demand, the key 
parameters in these simulations, range from 
–0.15 to –0.34.
  The model assumes imperfect substitu-
tion between domestic and foreign goods, 
as well as imperfect substitution across 
goods produced in each country. The de-
gree of price transmission between domes-
tic and international markets for each good 
or service is thus determined by the elastici-
ties of substitution between local and inter-
nationally traded goods and services, and 
the share of traded goods or services in total 
supply or demand. Domestic prices of goods 
and services do not track world prices 
closely unless the share of exports (imports) 
in domestic production (consumption) is 
large. The mathematical description of the 
model is detailed in Appendix B.
Simulation Results
In o rder to e v al uate po s s i b l e mar k e t o p-
portunities or constraints related to agri-
cultural growth in the sample countries, 
we examine six main growth scenarios. 
The first four model the effects of an exog-
enous increase in total factor productivity 
(TFP) in the traditional agricultural export 
sector (Scenario 1), the nontraditional ex-
port sector (Scenario 2), the grain sector 
(Scenario 3),5 and the grain and livestock 
sectors combined (Scenario 4). To further 
explore the effects of removing market 
constraints on the growth of the grain sec-
tor, we also simulate a grain trading facility 
in Scenario 3a. The last two scenarios com-
bine the effects of growth in agriculture 
with a reduction in marketing costs through 
an increase in the transport sector’s pro-
ductivity (Scenario 5) and increases in 
nonagricultural growth in selected sectors 
(Scenario 6) to further capture the agri-
cultural and nonagricultural linkages in 
growth. For each scenario, we use two dif-
ferent assumptions about labor supply, full 
employment and unemployment in un-
skilled labor, which implies that there are 
two different sets of general equilibrium 
solutions for each of the six scenarios. 
Most of the discussions in this section are 
4See Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982), pp. 482–483, for a discussion of the Frisch parameter and formulas 
to calculate price elasticities.
5We focus the analysis on grains, since the GTAP database used does not separate out roots and tubers (cassava 
is an important staple in parts of Mozambique, Zambia, and other countries in East and Southern Africa).  3 4    C H A P T E R   4
based on the full-employment assumption, 
although, if necessary, the equilibrium re-
sults with the assumption of unemployed 
unskilled labor are discussed in compari-
son with the results with the full-employ-
ment assumption. Table 4.1 summarizes 
other principal assumptions of each sce-
nario.  <<Table 4.1 near here>>
Scenario 1: Recovery of the Market 
Share of Traditional Export Crops
In Scenario 1, we simulate a recovery of lost 
markets for Africa’s traditional agricultural 
exports, including coffee, cocoa, cotton, tea, 
and tobacco.6 I n  t h i s  s i m u l a t i o n ,  w e  i n -
crease the TFP of traditional agricultural 
export sectors by 4.5 percent for cotton and 
3.2 percent for other traditional exports for 
12 years for the seven low-income countries 
in East and Southern Africa.7
  This optimistic scenario for traditional 
export crops produces somewhat disap-
pointing results in terms of the growth of 
r e a l  G D P ,  h o w e v e r .  W i t h  a  f i x e d - l a b o r -
supply assumption, the 3–5 percent TFP 
annual growth rate in the traditional export 
sectors modeled here increases real GDP 
per capita in the countries under study by 
0.13 percent on average annually and per 
capita total agricultural real income by 0.48 
percent (Table A9, part A, row 1). In alter-
native simulations that assume the existence 
of unemployed unskilled labor, additional 
per capita GDP growth rises to 0.28 percent 
6Tobacco, coffee, cocoa, and tea are aggregated into the “exportable other crops” sector in the GTAP 
database.
7A TFP growth rate of 3.2 percent is chosen such that the region returns to its historically highest level of such 
exports.
Table 4.1  Description of the model scenarios
Scenario
Sector TFP 
annual growth rate 
(%)
Scenario 1: High growth of traditional exports
Cotton 4.5
Other exportable crops, including tree crops 3.2
Scenario 2: High growth of nontraditional exports
Exportable vegetables and fruits 6.0
Scenario 3: High growth of grain sector
Rice, wheat, maize, and other coarse grains 2.5
Scenario 4: High growth of grains and livestock
Grains 2.5
Livestocka 3.0
Scenario 5: High growth in agriculture (Scenarios 1, 2, and 4) 
plus increased productivity of marketing
Transport sector 4.5
Scenario 6: With high growth in selected nonagricultural sectors (Scenario 5 
plus increased productivity of five nonagricultural sectors)
Selected manufacturing and private services 3.0
aCapital stock increased by the same percentage as total factor productivity (TFP); we also model an 
exogenous increase in consumer preference for livestock products.ECONOMYWIDE ANALYSIS OF GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES       35
and agricultural GDP to 0.67 percent per 
year (Table A9, part B, row 1). At the indi-
vidual country level, additional annual 
growth in a country’s per capita GDP ranges 
from as low as 0.08–0.11 percent in Mo-
zambique, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
to 0.14–0.15 percent in Madagascar, Uganda, 
and Tanzania assuming fixed labor supply, 
and 0.16–0.47 percent in the seven countries 
assuming underemployed unskilled labor 
(Table A9, column 4).
  The 3 to 5 percent TFP annual growth 
rate in the traditional export sectors mod-
eled here results in different sectoral pro-
duction and export growth owing to the dif-
f e r e n t  s i z e s  o f  e a c h  s e c t o r  i n  t h e  s a m p l e  
countries. For example, tobacco is a domi-
nant traditional export crop in Malawi and 
Zimbabwe, but in the simulation annual 
growth is only 1.9 percent and 3.2 percent, 
respectively, in traditional exportable pro-
duction. On the other hand, the sector’s pro-
duction grows at 5–9 percent in the other 
five low-income countries. Increases in pro-
duction result in rapid growth in traditional 
exports, a growth rate higher than 10 per-
cent for five countries, all except Malawi 
and Zimbabwe, in which a much more mod-
est growth rate (1.9 and 3.6 percent, respec-
tively) is observed. However, given that the 
size of the traditional agricultural export 
sector is relatively large in Malawi and Zim-
babwe (13 and 29 percent, respectively, in 
the data), growth in total agricultural ex-
ports is comparable across the seven coun-
tries, ranging from 1.37 percent in Malawi 
to 4.71 percent in Uganda (Table A9, part A, 
column 9).8
  There are two major reasons why rapid 
growth in traditional exports fails to in-
crease real GDP substantially in this sce-
nario. First, for most of the sample coun-
tries, the traditional export sector accounts 
for a small share of the total agricultural 
G D P ,  e v e n  th o u gh  i t  ac c o un ts  f o r  a  l ar g e 
share in its total agricultural exports. More-
over, this simulation does not assume a re-
turn of world prices to historical high levels. 
In fact, in the simulation, increased produc-
tion and exports cause the world prices for 
the traditional commodities to fall slightly. 
An increase in world prices to the average 
levels of the mid-1970s (historical peak pe-
riod for many crops) would increase the 
revenues generated from exports, but such a 
recovery in medium-term average prices 
seems unlikely.
  The second reason is that markets for 
the traditional export commodities involve 
relatively little domestic processing and 
therefore generate only weak linkage effects 
through the domestic market economy. Only 
the farmers cultivating these crops reap 
major direct benefits from increased ex-
ports, and their increased income and that 
from the directly related nonagricultural 
sectors cannot provide enough demand to 
stimulate further growth in broad agricul-
tural and nonagricultural sectors. Calcu-
lated growth multipliers (real GDP growth 
induced by a one unit increase in the tradi-
tional export sector’s value added) are quite 
small for most countries (see Table 4.3, col-
umn 1). Note that market opportunities and 
hence growth contributions of traditional 
agricultural products can significantly in-
crease if the quality of the products can be 
improved or if the products can be pro-
cessed (even just go through primary pro-
cessing) within the region. There is a sub-
stantial difference between a brand product, 
for example, a gourmet coffee, and a non-
brand product. Improving product quality 
will generate more farm income from the 
same volume of production, and processing 
the products in the region will provide more 
employment and improve the linkage ef-
fects both within the producing country and 
to some extent to neighboring African trad-
ing partners.
8Cotton is actually a nontraditional export crop in Zambia. We have to treat it as a traditional sector in all coun-
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Scenario 2: Rapid Growth of 
Nontraditional Agricultural Exports
In Scenario 2, we model an increase in non-
traditional agricultural exports by increas-
ing the TFP of the nontraditional agricul-
tural export sector by 4 percent annually for 
12 years and endogenously increasing capi-
tal stock in the sector by 3.2–7.9 percent, 
except for Zimbabwe, such that the growth 
rate in the sample countries’ exportable fruit 
and vegetable sector production approxi-
mates the growth rate that Kenya has expe-
rienced in its horticultural sector in the last 
20 years.
  In this scenario, in which they face no 
significant market constraints,9 nontradi-
tional exports increase annually by 1 6 per -
cent in Madagascar to 24 percent in Uganda. 
In Zimbabwe, the increase is only 10 percent 
per year because of a much smaller increase 
in capital accumulation (0.9 percent per year). 
These growth rates almost double the aver-
age annual growth rate of Kenya’s fruit and 
vegetable exports over the past 20 years.10
  However, assuming a fixed labor supply, 
accelerated growth in nontraditional exports 
raises these countries’ per capita real GDP by 
only 0.01–0.05 percent per year (Table 4.2, 
part A, column 2). The growth rate of agri-
cultural income is also modest: 0.21 percent 
per capita in Mozambique, 0.10–0.16 per-
cent in Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, and 
Uganda, with slight declines in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. If unemployment in unskilled 
labor is assumed,11 high growth in nontradi-
tional exports would only create additional 
annual employment opportunities equivalent 
to 0.09–0.29 percent of the labor forces that 
are currently employed in the agricultural 
sector in the six countries (and 0.06 percent 
in Zimbabwe). More employment opportuni-
ties enhance the effect of economywide link-
ages of nontraditional exports, resulting in an 
annual growth rate of real GDP that is more 
than double in each of the sev en countries 
under the unemployed-unskilled-labor as-
sumption. In Malawi, Madagascar, Mozam-
bique, Tanzania, and Uganda, for example, 
the per capita annual growth rate of real GDP 
rises to 0.06–0.11 percent per year with un-
employed unskilled labor, from 0.02–0.05 
percent with a fixed labor supply (Table 4.2, 
part B, column 2).  <<Table 4.2 near here>>
  Thus, these simulations show that given 
the small initial size of the sector, even a very 
r a p i d  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p o r t s  d o e s  n o t  
contribute much to growth in total agricul-
tural income or total GDP for the countries 
included in the sample. Note, however, that 
this simulation may underestimate the dy-
namics of the sector and its growth linkage 
effect through induced technological change 
and investment in nonagriculture, such as 
in  processing, packaging, transporting, and 
marketing sectors, given that the model does 
not include any endogenous change in tech-
nology or investment induced by growth in 
nontraditional exports. Experiences with both 
nontraditional agricultural exports in Kenya 
a n d  e x p o r t - l e d  g r o w t h  i n  E a s t  A s i a  h a v e  
shown much stronger dynamic linkages be-
tween exports and technological changes and 
investment (both in agriculture and nonagri-
culture). We try to partially address these 
issues in Scenarios 5 and 6. 
Scenario 3: Productivity Growth 
in the Grain Sector
In Scenario 3, we increase the TFP in the 
cereal sector (rice, wheat, maize, and other 
9In the model simulations, increased nontraditional exports by East and Southern African low-income countries 
do not lead to a decline in world prices because of the region’s very small initial share in total world trade in 
these products. 
10These growth rates in exports are derived assuming fixed labor supplies with no unemployment and market-
clearing real wages in each country.
11To simulate potential growth linkages due to increased productive use of previously underemployed factors, 
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cereals) by 2.5 percent per year, which re-
sults in additional growth in grain produc-
tion by 0.5 5 percent in Zimbabwe to 2. 1 3 
percent in Mozambique annually (Table 
A10, part A, column 1). The real prices of 
grains fall, since the increase in supply ex-
ceeds the growth in demand. As a result, 
farm income falls in five of the seven coun-
tries and rises slightly in Mozambique and 
U g a n d a  ( T a b l e  A 1 0 ,  p a r t  A ,  c o l u m n  6 ) .  
Consumers as a whole benefit from in-
creased overall growth and lower grain 
prices, and food consumption increases by 
0.11–0.43 percent annually in the seven 
c o un tri e s  (T a b l e  A 1 0 ,  p art  A ,  c o l umn  7 ). 
Moreover, in addition to the 0.23–1.06 per-
cent increase in consumption of grain prod-
ucts, demand for other food commodities 
also increases. Overall, growth in per capita 
real GDP increases by 0.09 to 0.27 percent 
per year in six countries, but only 0.03 per-
cent in Zimbabwe, owing to adverse price 
impacts, as well as to the relatively small 
share of maize production in overall GDP 
(Table A10, part A, column 5).
  Differences in the magnitude of the ini-
tial increases in sectoral production to some 
extent obscure comparisons of the efficiency 
of the alternative growth strategies pre-
sented earlier. To facilitate the comparison 
of alternative investments and strategies, we 
calculate growth multipliers defined as the 
total increase in real GDP divided by the 
increase in the shocked sector’s total value 
added, both measured at the initial (base-
year) level of prices.12
  As shown in Table 4.3, the grain sector’s 
growth multipliers are in general large. A one 
unit increase in the grain sector’s output (in 
terms of value added measured by the base-
year prices) results in 1.80–3.47 unit increase 
in total real GDP across the seven countries 
(assuming underemployed unskilled labor; 
Table 4.3, part B, column 3). These grain 
sector multipliers are higher than multipliers 
in the two exportable agricultural subsectors 
in most countries. The exceptions are Mo-
zambique and Uganda, in which the nontra-
ditional export sector has the highest growth 
multiplier. Nontraditional agricultural export 
growth multipliers are 2.50 and 2.63 in Mo-
zambique and Uganda, respectively, as com-
pared to 1.04–1.83 in the other five countries. 
The traditional export growth multiplier is 
close to or greater than 1.5 in four countries, 
but less than 1 in Mozambique (T able 4.3, 
part B, columns 1–3). Moreover, productivity 
growth in food crop sectors benefits consum-
ers through reductions in real prices of food, 
in contrast to productivity growth in export 
sectors that generates positive impacts on 
nonproducing households only through in-
come multiplier effects.13  
< < T a b l e   4 . 3   n e a r   h e r e > >
Scenario 3a: Productivity Growth 
in the Grain Sector with a Grain 
Trading Facility
One possible mechanism to help maintain 
the domestic agricultural terms of trade is 
through government intervention in mar-
k e ts t o in creas e im po rt s u b s ti tu ti o n an d 
total demand. Following Adelman (1984), 
we model a grain-trading facility in Sce-
nario 3a that buys up part of the domestic 
supply. The cost of these grain purchases 
is covered by a lump sum tax on the con-
sumers as a group.14
  Compared with Scenario 3 in which 
grain imports fall by only 4.24–8.78 percent 
in the six countries (and fall by 2.45 percent 
12See Bell and Hazell (1980) for an early methodological discussion of alternative multiplier models used in 
growth linkage analysis, and the discussion of Haggblade, Hammer, and Hazell (1991) on the improvement in 
the multiplier models with limited price endogeneity.
13The resulting multipliers derived using CGE models are in general relatively smaller than the standard fixed-
price multipliers.
14In the model simulation, purchase of the grain-trading facility is a new endogenous variable that is perfectly 
substituted with imported grains.  4 0    C H A P T E R   4
in Zambia), introducing the grain trading 
facility results in a decline of grain imports 
by 22.5–51.8 percent (Table A10, part B, 
column 3). As a result of a smaller (in abso-
lute magnitude) negative terms-of-trade ef-
fect on grain producers, grain production 
further increases in all seven countries (com-
pared to the simulations with the same level 
of TFP growth rate). In general, the produc-
tion increases are larger in the countries with 
relatively large declines in imports. For ex-
ample, the growth rate of grain production 
rises to 12.1 percent in Mozambique (from 
2.1 percent), and imports of grain fall by 
65.4 percent. Similarly, grain production 
grows at rates of 6.3 and 3.6 percent, respec-
tively, in Uganda and Malawi (compared to 
1.9 and 1.4 percent in Scenario 3), and im-
ports fall by 41.6 and 51.8 percent. As a re-
sult of this import substitution in Scenario 
3a, per capita real GDP annual growth rises 
by 0.04 to 0.26 percent in the seven countries 
(Table 4.2, part A, column 4).
Scenario 4: Productivity Growth in 
the Grain and Livestock Sectors
Another way to improve terms of trade in 
the grain sector is to have simultaneous 
growth in livestock production. Thus, in 
Scenario 4, in addition to increasing TFP 
growth in the grain sector by 2.5 percent 
(Scenario 3), we increase TFP and the capi-
tal stock level in the livestock sector by 3 
percent per year.15 We also adjust consumer 
preferences toward demand for more live-
stock products at the same price and income 
levels, which reflects long-run changes in 
consumer tastes and livestock product avail-
ability not captured with income and price 
elasticities.
  In this simulation, grain production does 
not increase in most countries relative to 
Scenario 3, and declines in grain prices be-
come relatively modest. Thus, per capita 
GDP growth rates relative to those in Sce-
nario 3 (increased productivity in grain sec-
tors alone) are close to double or even more 
than double in all seven countries. For ex-
ample, the growth rate of per capita GDP 
increases to 0.64 percent (from 0.18 percent 
in Scenario 3) in Madagascar, and to 0.54 
and 0.49 percent in Tanzania and Uganda, 
respectively (Table 4.2, part A, column 5). 
T h e  m o r e  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  o n  G D P  i n  t h i s  
scenario is largely due to productivity gains 
in livestock, as well as greater demand for 
grain in livestock feed and as food, which 
results in grain prices falling less than in 
S c e n a r i o  3 .  C o n s u m e r s  a l s o  h a v e  m u c h  
greater benefit than in the grain-growth-
only scenario (Scenario 3) or in the export-
growth scenarios (Scenarios 1 and 2), and 
total food consumption per capita increases 
by 1.25–4.48 percent in the seven countries 
(Table A10, part C, column 7).
Scenario 5: Implications of 
Reduced Marketing Costs
Results of the first four scenarios suggest 
only limited impact of rapid growth on 
real GDP in each agricultural subsector, 
in spite of large multiplier effects in grain 
sector growth. In part, this is due to the 
small size of each of these subsectors 
(particularly nontraditional exports) rela-
tive to the overall economies. The scale of 
a sector is a factor in generating overall 
economic growth. For example, the com-
bined four agricultural subsectors ana-
lyzed in Scenarios 1, 2, and 4 is around 10 
percent of GDP in Mozambique, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe, whereas growth in the 
three of them combined results in a GDP 
annual growth rate of 0.27–0.33 percent 
per capita in these three countries (with a 
fixed-labor-supply assumption, Table 4.2, 
part A, column 6). On the other hand, in 
Madagascar and Tanzania the combined 
four agricultural subsectors account for 
24–25 percent of GDP, so growth in these 
four subsectors combined generates a per 
capita GDP annual growth of 0.82 percent 
and 0.76 percent, respectively (Table 4.2, 
part A, column 6).
15The current growth rate of livestock production in the region, as calculated from FAO data, is less than 3 
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  This result suggests that investment 
and productivity gains outside the agricul-
tural sector are needed to maximize 
growth linkages and overall benefits of 
agricultural growth. Spurring additional 
market demand is thus a key condition for 
enabling increases in agricultural produc-
tion to lead to substantial increases in 
farmers’ real incomes. Scenarios 5 and 6 
explore such linkage effects.
  Scenario 5 deals with the implications 
of reducing market costs in order to en-
hance effective demand for agricultural 
products. Although improving the perfor-
mance of agricultural markets requires 
m u c h  m o r e  t h a n  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  r o a d s ,  
communications, and other infrastruc-
ture,16 in this scenario we focus on market 
e f f i c i e n c y  b y  e x p l i c i t l y  m o d e l i n g  a  4 . 5  
percent increase in TFP in the transport 
sector, along with the productivity in-
creases in the agricultural sector (combin-
ing Scenarios 1, 2, and 4). This increase in 
productivity reduces unit costs of transport 
and ultimately reduces input costs in other 
sectors of the economy. Moreover, the re-
duction in transport directly affects interna-
tional trade by reducing the gap between 
domestic and border prices.17 Improving 
the transportation sector’s productivity 
lowers the unit cost of services provided 
by the sector, which reduces the market 
costs for trade in both agricultural and 
nonagricultural products, and thus in-
creases marketing efficiency.
  When growth in agriculture is com-
bined with a more efficient transport sec-
tor, both total GDP and farm income in-
crease sharply: additional GDP per capita 
annual growth rises to close to or more 
than 1 percent in five of the countries (all 
except Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Table 
4.2, part A, column 7), and per capita 
farm income goes up by close to or more 
than 2 percent in all seven countries 
(Table A12, part B, column 2). Agricul-
tural exports benefit more from improv-
ing the transport sector’s productivity: 
total agricultural exports annually in-
crease by 4.17–6.18 percent per capita in 
six countries and by 8.43 percent in Zam-
bia (Table A12, part B, column 6). Mala-
wi’s agricultural export growth rate in this 
scenari o is more than tw o times hi gher 
than the growth rate in the scenarios of 
agricultural growth alone. For the other 
six countries, agricultural export growth 
rates increase by 30 to 90 percent. Agri-
cultural producer prices fall less than in 
the scenario with agricultural growth 
only, although the food consumption price 
index still falls in all the countries except 
Uganda. Total food consumption rises 
and livestock product consumption in-
creases significantly (7–12 percent) in the 
seven countries, indicating the existence 
of potential market opportunities for agri-
culture, especially for livestock products.
Scenario 6: Easing the Domestic 
Demand Constraint by Combining 
Agricultural and Nonagricultural 
Growth
Another major potential source for increas-
ing market demand for agricultural products 
is through growth in nonagricultural in-
comes. One avenue for achieving such 
growth is through the multiplier effects that 
emanate from agricultural growth (which 
were captured to some extent in the earlier 
simulations).18 A second major avenue for 
increasing demand is through investments 
16See, for example, the discussion of Poulton, Kydd, and Dorward (2006) about the factors and policies affecting 
market efficiency in African agriculture.
17These margins are calculated using the data of CIF and FOB prices for African countries with their trading 
partners bilaterally (Limao and Venables 2001).
18The CGE model used in this analysis, however, does not include the dynamic role of the regional and inter-
national market demand for stimulating growth, aspects that are better modeled in endogenous growth models 
(see Diao, Roe, and Yeldan 1999).4 2    C H A P T E R   4
and increases in TFP in nonagricultural ac-
tivities. Scenario 6 captures some of these 
interlinkages between agriculture and the 
rest of the economy by combining the exog-
enous productivity shocks included in Sce-
nario 5 with an increase in TFP growth in 
some nonagricultural sectors of 3 percent 
per year. Specifically, a 3 percent TFP 
growth is assumed for textile and other 
labor-intensive manufacturing and private 
service sectors (including, apart from trans-
portation, trade and other business-related 
private services). There is no additional 
productivity growth in the sectors depen-
dent on natural resources and government 
services in the scenario. In total, the nonag-
ricultural sectors (including the transport 
sector) modeled with high TFP growth ac-
count for more than 50 percent of national 
income in Malawi and Zambia, 40 percent 
in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 30 percent 
in Tanzania and Madagascar, and 20 per-
cent in Uganda.
  The simulation results illustrate the im-
portance of demand effects and the inter-
linkages between agriculture and nonagri-
culture. Improving growth performance of 
labor-intensive manufacturing and private 
services boosts total GDP in all seven coun-
tries (more than 2 percent of additional 
growth per capita annually in Malawi and 
Zambia, close to 2 percent in Madagascar 
and Tanzania, and 1.44 to 1.77 percent in 
Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique 
(Table 4.2, part A, column 8). Such growth 
in nonagriculture also spurs agricultural 
growth through increased demand for agri-
cultural products. Farm income increases 
by 3.02 and 3.45 percent, respectively, in 
Uganda and Tanzania, and by close to or 
more than 4.0 percent per capita annually in 
the other five countries. Some 50–85 per-
cent of the increase in farm income is 
largely achieved by nonagricultural produc-
tivity alone, and the smaller the contribution 
of agriculture to the economy (for example, 
in Zambia and Mozambique), the larger the 
share of the increased farm income that can 
be explained by nonagricultural productiv-
ity growth.
  Per capita growth in total food con-
sumption increases by 1.69 percent in 
Uganda, 2.80 percent in Mozambique, 3.21 
and 3.83 percent in Tanzania and Zambia, 
4.47 and 4.58 percent in Malawi and Mada-
gascar, and 6.19 percent in Zimbabwe (Table 
A12, part C, column 3). Still, livestock con-
sumption shows strong growth with high 
income elasticity (with 10–13 percent of an-
nual growth in six countries and 7 percent, 
given a modest GDP growth, in Uganda). 
Although grain consumption would grow 
more slowly than income growth given that 
it is income inelastic, there is still 0.8–0.9 
percent of growth per capita in grain con-
sumption in the five countries and more 
than 1 percent in Uganda. In Madagascar, 
however, the growth rate is a very modest 
0.2 percent annually. Moreover, in some of 
these countries growth in agricultural im-
ports is more rapid than the growth in agri-
cultural exports (for example, in Malawi 
and Zimbabwe agricultural imports grow at 
8.5 and 5.5 percent, respectively), indicating 
that potential intraregional trade has to be 
further explored.
  The 3 percent TFP annual growth in se-
lected manufacturing and services may be 
o v e r l y  o p timi s ti c  in  s o m e  c o u n tri e s  g i v e n  
the investment, technological, and institu-
tional constraints that inhibit growth in 
these countries.19 Nonetheless, even though 
the mechanisms for achieving high produc-
tivity growth in nonagriculture are not spec-
i f i e d ,  t h i s  s c e n a r i o  d o e s  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  
demand-side role for agricultural growth 
19Per capita GDP growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa averaged only 2.4 percent in 2003–04, however, implying 
a similar rate of TFP growth in all sectors (assuming labor force and capital growing at approximately the same 
growth rate as population). Nonetheless, a 3 percent TFP annual growth in overall GDP has been achieved in 
Ghana, Uganda, and other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (World Bank World Development 
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and the importance of growth in nonagri-
culture for achieving growth in total 
income.
Summary 
Results from the world CGE model of alter-
native growth scenarios for the seven sam-
ple African countries indicate that an ex-
port-led agricultural growth strategy without 
substantial reduction in marketing costs and 
an increase in nonagricultural productivity 
is unlikely to generate substantial overall 
income growth. Simulation of a recovery of 
their traditional exports to their historical 
high and regaining their lost markets results 
in an additional 0.08–0.15 percent annual 
growth in per capita GDP. Even with an as-
sumpti on o f more emp l o yment opportuni-
ties, the additional per capita GDP growth 
rate is only in the range of 0.16–0.47 percent 
per year. Given their relatively small size in 
most of the economies studied, simulated 
10–24 percent of annual growth in nontradi-
tional exports generates additional annual 
per capita GDP growth of only 0.01–0.05 
p e r c e n t .  E v e n  w i t h  a n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a s -
sumption, the greatest impact on per capita 
GDP growth among the seven countries is 
0.11 percent a year (in Tanzania and 
Uganda).
  The grain sector has stronger growth 
linkages with nonagriculture than the ex-
port-orientated agriculture sector does. 
However, without simultaneous growth in 
income generated outside the grain sector 
and significant substitution for imports 
through improving market channels, pro-
ductivity in the grain sector can cause a 
shift in domestic terms of trade against 
agriculture, negating the income benefits 
of productivity improvement. Certain 
government interventions in markets to 
help stimulate import substitution can re-
sult in a significant decline in grain im-
ports and a rise in farm income. Simulta-
neous productivity growth in food crops 
and livestock also offer more potential for 
increasing farm incomes.
  However, accelerated productivity 
growth in all of these agricultural subsec-
tors (traditional and nontraditional ex-
ports, grains, and livestock) has only a 
limited impact on real GDP owing to their 
r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  s i z e  i n  e a c h  c o u n t r y ’ s  
overall economy. Combined growth of 
these agricultural subsectors results in ad-
ditional per capita GDP annual growth 
rate of 0.39–1.51 percent in the seven 
countries even with new employment 
opportunities.
  Reduced marketing costs are crucial 
t o  r e d u c i n g  c o n s u m e r  f o o d  p r i c e s  a n d  
raising producer incomes in the longer 
run. The model simulation combining 
productivity growth in agriculture with 
reduction in marketing costs suggests that 
the resulting increase in per capita GDP 
would be close to or more than 2 percent 
per year in Madagascar, Tanzania, and 
Uganda, with new employment opportu-
nities. Another important way to acceler-
ate growth in domestic food demand is by 
increasing incomes in the nonagricultural 
sectors. Some of the growth in nonagri-
cultural productivity can be spurred by 
growth linkages, including those derived 
from additional spending of higher agri-
cultural incomes by farm households. Ag-
riculture can thus serve as one engine of 
growth, but economywide growth will 
likely require more than one engine. A 
second major avenue for increasing agri-
c u l t u r a l  d e m a n d  i s  t hr o u g h  i n v e s t m e n t s  
that increase productivity in the nonagri-
cultural sector itself. With an optimistic 
assumption for growth in that sector, sim-
ulation results suggest a high payoff from 
the two-engine growth strategy. Combin-
ing similar agricultural and nonagricul-
tural productivity growth results in much 
higher farm income growth, which reaches 
3.0–4.4 percent per capita annually in the 
seven countries studied.
  Three important caveats should be 
noted. First, the analysis presented here fo-
cuses explicitly on demand-side constraints 
of agricultural growth, assuming that sub-4 4    C H A P T E R   4
sector level growth is achievable. However, 
productivity growth itself is not a natural 
process and is constrained by many institu-
tional, policy, and technological conditions. 
The underperformance of Africa’s agricul-
ture in the last four decades indicates that 
many components in these areas are not 
functioning effectively. Improving condi-
tions involves not only a series of policy and 
institutional reforms, but also requires a 
significant increase in public and private in-
vestment. Many such reforms and invest-
ments will improve the overall environment 
of agricultural growth by increasing the sec-
tor’s efficiency, productivity, and market 
competitiveness, including market develop-
ment, institutional and policy reforms to 
encourage private-sector investment, public 
and private investment in infrastructure 
such as roads, telecommunications, and 
other information systems. However, cer-
tain sector-related investments are needed 
as well, and the cost of productivity growth 
can be significantly different across agricul-
tural subsectors. For example, investment in 
nontraditional agricultural exports is often 
led by the private sector, whereas signifi-
cant improvement of productivity in the 
staple crop and livestock sectors generally 
calls for increased public expenditure in 
agricultural research and extension and in 
market risk management systems. Owing to 
such differences in the costs of productivity 
enhancement among sectors, the calculated 
GDP growth effects driven by improvement 
in various agricultural subsectors should be 
interpreted with caution.
  Second, the analysis has not assessed 
the technological feasibility of increased 
agricultural and nonagricultural produc-
tivity . Although some agricultural scien-
tists and knowledgeable observers are 
  optimistic about technological potential 
and some notable successes have been 
achieved,20 it is by no means certain that 
suitable technological packages that are 
well adapted to diverse local conditions 
are available or that agricultural informa-
tion services are effective in disseminating 
this technology. Moreover, other   factors 
might also limit agricultural productivity 
growth, including severe labor constraints 
related to widespread HIV/AIDS in some 
areas, governance problems, and civil 
strife. Moreover, if rapid agricultural pro-
ductivity growth should prove not to be 
feasible, the issue of demand constraints 
may not even arise.
  Third, this analysis has not considered 
impacts of various alternative productiv-
ity shocks on income distribution and 
poverty. Though the simulations presented 
here provide information on the effects on 
labor earnings, agricultural incomes, and 
food consumption in aggregate, differ-
ences in effects for various types of house-
holds across countries are inevitable. Pro-
ductivity increases in grains and other 
major food staples, in particular, are likely 
to have a greater impact on poverty and 
food consumption than growth in tradi-
tional and nontraditional export agricul-
ture because of their broad base (see, for 
e x am p l e ,  fi v e  c o u n tri e s ’  c a s e  s tu d i e s  i n  
Diao et al. 2006).21 Given that reduction 
in poverty and hunger is a major develop-
m e n t  o b j e c t i v e ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  s h o u l d  b e  
extended beyond consideration of impacts 
on economic growth and aggregate 
consumption.
20See, for example, Sanders, Shapiro, and Ramasamy 1996; Beyerlee and Eicher 1997; ICRISAT 2001; WARDA 
2006. They argue that seed/fertilizer technologies that could significantly improve productivity of cereal crops 
are available for many medium- to high-potential zones of Africa.




n today’s more integrated world economy, agricultural growth in Sub-Saharan Africa cru-
cially depends on improving African countries’ competitiveness in the world agricultural 
market and thus expanding their marketing opportunities. This report focused on demand-
side constraints and their implications for three broad alternative agricultural development 
strategies (promoting traditional export, nontraditional export, and food staple growth) in East 
and Southern Africa.
  We have addressed three major questions. First, how constraining will demand be for fu-
ture agricultural growth in Sub-  Saharan Africa and is there sufficient demand for agricultural 
products to permit agriculture to grow at a rate that can significantly reduce poverty and hun-
ger? Second, if technological change and increase in supply are achieved, which agricultural 
subsectors offer the greatest potential and can   become more powerful engines for raising real 
incomes and increasing food consumption? Finally, what are the implications of reductions in 
marketing costs and growth linkages with nonagricultural sectors in achieving increasing 
market demand for agriculture? We addressed these issues through a combination of an analy-
sis of historical trends in agricultural exports, a comparative advantage analysis in intrare-
gional trade, and trade and income growth under various alternative scenarios in a world CGE 
simulation model.
  Historical trends show that over the past two decades Sub-Saharan Africa has been suffer-
ing from declining terms of trade and substantial price instability for traditional exports. Be-
sides limited growth in global demand for these traditional agricultural commodities and in-
creasing competition from other countries, Sub-Saharan African countries are also constrained 
by low productivity, problems with maintaining quality, and asymmetric agricultural and trade 
policies of wealthy nations (especially production subsidies). Despite African countries’ sig-
nificant market reform initiatives, future growth prospects for the region’s traditional agricul-
tural exports do not appear promising unless their competitiveness is increased by improving 
productivity, product quality and variety, and marketing conditions.
  Although Sub-Saharan Africa does have the potential to recover its lost world market share 
and volume of exports of traditional export crops, the CGE model simulations show that this 
would have only a small impact on real incomes for the countries studied. A major reason for 
the limited impact of an increase in traditional exports is that they account for a relatively 
small part of the GDP in these economies and have weak linkages with other domestic sectors. 
Unfortunately, world prices for these commodities are currently rather low, and a recovery in 
world prices to levels of the early 1970s is unlikely.
  Our analysis suggests that demand need not constrain rapid growth in nontraditional ex-
ports. Given the low current levels of production and minute share of world trade, nontradi-
tional export agriculture offers perhaps the most promising opportunities for growth. Nonethe-
less, to a large extent, nontraditional exports consist of numerous products that are targeted to 4 6    C H A P T E R     5
niche markets. Some countries have achieved 
notable success (for example, Kenya’s horti-
cultural exports), but this success may not 
be so easily replicated, particularly where 
macroeconomic or political instability make 
private investment in export activities highly 
risky. The model simulation analysis for 
East and Southern Africa shows that even 
under optimistic assumptions about produc-
tivity growth in nontraditional export crops 
(for example, 10–24 percent annual export 
growth in the seven countries studied), ac-
celeration of growth in this sector alone will 
have only a minimal effect on the growth of 
their real GDP.
  Unlike most traditional and nontradi-
tional agricultural exports, domestic demand 
and production of food crops and livestock 
products far exceeds internationally traded 
quantities in Africa. Supply of many staple 
commodities cannot meet with current de-
mand, and total food demand in the region is 
projected to further increase considerably in 
the next 10–20 years (for example, cereal 
demand will be 60 percent higher than the 
current level by 2015). Existing and growing 
food demand in Africa offers a great poten-
tial for significant expansion of markets for 
many staple products. The regional compar-
ative advantage analysis shows that many 
African countries import a long list of agri-
cultural commodities from outside the re-
gion, including commodities that are ex-
ported by their regional neighbors, with food 
staples having the greatest growth potential 
for increased intraregional trade. However, 
the CGE model simulation analysis for East 
and Southern Africa shows that without si-
multaneous growth in income generated 
outside the sector, productivity growth in the 
grain sector can cause a shift in domestic 
terms of trade against agriculture, negating 
the income benefit of productivity improve-
ment. Certain government interventions to 
help stimulate import substitution can help 
reduce these adverse terms-of-trade effects. 
Simultaneous productivity growth in food 
crops and livestock also offers potential for 
increasing farm incomes.
  The CGE model simulations also indi-
cate that simultaneous lowering of real mar-
keting costs can significantly enhance the 
increases in farm incomes and food con-
sumption from productivity growth in agri-
culture. Such a reduction in marketing costs 
would require investments in marketing in-
frastructure (roads and bridges, ports, stor-
age facilities, electricity, and so on) and de-
velopment of market institutions (see, for 
example, Kherallah et al. 2002). Supple-
menting productivity increases with a re-
duction in marketing costs results in an ad-
ditional growth in per capita GDP to close 
to or more than 2 percent per year in the 
model simulations.
  Accelerating growth in domestic de-
mand for foods by increasing income in the 
nonagricultural sectors would also avoid 
negative terms-of-trade effects. Some of the 
growth in nonagricultural productivity can 
be spurred by growth linkages, including 
those deriving from additional farm house-
h o l d  s p e n d i n g  o f  h i g h e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  i n -
comes. Agriculture can thus serve as one 
engine of growth, but economywide growth 
will likely require more than one engine.1 A 
second major avenue for increasing agricul-
tural demand is through investments that 
increase productivity in the nonagricultural 
sector itself. Simulation results suggest that 
combined with growth in nonagricultural 
productivity, such growth in agriculture re-
sults in a much larger increase in agricul-
tural real income, reaching 3.0–4.4 percent 
per capita annually in the seven countries 
studied.
  A number of caveats are in order in in-
terpreting these results, however. The struc-
ture of agriculture, the potential for agricul-
tural exports, and many other economic and 
1In fact, a structural transformation in which the nonagricultural sector grows faster than the agricultural sec-
tor is the typical pattern of economic growth. See Diao et al. (2006) for further analysis of such a structural 
transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa.  C O N C L U S I O N S      4 7
political factors vary enormously across 
countries in Africa. This report has focused 
mainly on the regional level, although the 
CGE model and simulations of alternative 
growth scenarios are for the seven East and 
Southern African countries with available 
data. Obviously, an individual country’s cir-
cumstances, such as its stage of develop-
ment, degree of urbanization, geography 
and size, and, more importantly, the devel-
opmental capability of its governments, all 
affect the types of state interventions and 
policy choices. Given the existing diversities 
across countries and regions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, further work is needed for both de-
velopment of typologies and for country-
level assessments of alternative agricultural 
development strategies. Moreover, differ-
ences in effects for various types of house-
holds are inevitable across countries. Pro-
ductivity increases in grains and other major 
food staples, in particular, are likely to have 
larger effects on poverty and food consump-
tion than growth in traditional and nontradi-
tional export agriculture in the early stages 
of development because of the broad base. 
Given that reduction in poverty and hunger 
is a major development objective, the analy-
sis should be extended beyond consideration 
of impacts on economic growth and aggre-
gate consumption.
  Nonetheless, the results presented here 
have clear implications for the design of 
agricultural development and long-term 
food security strategies. First, overall de-
mand constraints need not limit agricultural 
productivity growth for nontraditional ex-
ports in the medium term. There is also 
some scope for increased effective demand 
for food grains, especially in conjunction 
with programs that expand the livestock 
sector. Trade restrictions and domestic pric-
ing policies are particularly important, and 
better integration of regional markets could 
provide important outlets for increased 
grain production in some countries.
  Second, there is a high payoff to reduc-
ing transaction costs in agricultural mar-
kets. In the short run, rapid increases in ag-
ricultural production can lead to sharp price 
declines where markets are thin and under-
developed. Reduced marketing costs are 
crucial to reducing consumer food prices, 
and in the longer run raise producer incomes 
as well. Operationally, public investment in 
marketing infrastructure (roads, electricity, 
telecommunications) involve tough choices 
and will require rigorous cost-benefit analy-
ses to assess priorities for investment across 
regions (for example, near urban centers 
and ports to promote international trade 
versus roads in more isolated areas) and the 
types of investments (for example, building 
feeder roads versus main roads). Policy 
frameworks that encourage private invest-
ment in cold storage and agricultural pro-
cessing activities are also needed. Thus, 
well-designed investments in infrastructure 
and policy reforms that lead to reductions 
in transaction costs have the potential to 
benefit a wide spectrum of agricultural 
(and nonagricultural) activities and avoid 
the problem of requiring the government to 
pick “winners” among competing crops or 
agricultural activities.
  Finally, without growth in the nonagri-
cultural sector, gains in overall incomes and 
calorie consumption for Sub-Saharan Af-
rica as a whole will be limited. Thus, invest-
ments in agriculture and other efforts to 
promote greater agricultural productivity 
have to be in tandem with policies and in-
vestments to spur nonagricultural growth. 
Moreover, investments in rural infrastruc-
ture can help to maximize positive linkage 
effects of agricultural growth. Agricultural 
growth can play a major role in increasing 
food production, but sustained increases in 
incomes and reductions in poverty are likely 
to require a combination of labor-intensive 




Table A1  Major coffee exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
  Average annual exports
(million tons)
Ranking in Sub-Saharan Africa   
(order)  
  1970–74 2000–03   1970–74 2000–03
Angola 195,037 1,157 3 20
Benin 1,679 4 22 25
Burundi 21,578 20,275 11 7
Cameroon 75,021 62,878 4 4
Central African Republic 8,935 5,028 13 13
Congo, Democratic Republic of 69,080 11,430 7 9
Congo, Republic of 860 3,127 21 17
Côte d’Ivoire 208,922 185,650 1 1
Equatorial Guinea 5,784 322 18 22
Ethiopia 73,184 117,624 6 3
Gabon 379 40 24 24
Ghana 4,430 2,096 17 18
Guinea 7,492 11,021 16 10
Kenya 64,129 55,527 5 5
Liberia 5,288 334 15 21
Madagascar 58,165 4,815 8 14
Malawi 173 3,421 25 16
Mali 988 0 23 26
Nigeria 2,674 305 20 23
Rwanda 16,989 17,228 10 8
Sierra Leone 8,019 1,896 14 19
Tanzania 47,310 44,710 9 6
Togo 11,592 6,236 12 11
Uganda 201,078 129,315 2 2
Zambia 0 5,270 26 12
Zimbabwe 1,130 4,109 19 15
 Subtotal 1,089,915 693,818
  Total Sub-Saharan Africa 1,090,094 693,908  























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.6 2    A P P E N D I X   A
     
Table A8  Economic structure of seven low-income countries in East and Southern Africa
  Malawi Mada gascar
Moza m-
bique Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
A. GDP and AgGDP
GDP (current million US$) 1,714 5,474 4,321 10,297 6,297 4,335 17,750
Population (million) 11.0 16.9 18.8 35.9 25.3 10.4 13.1
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 157 233 255 309 277 354 479
Agricultural GDP (current million US$) 601 1,465 1,013 4,254 1,867 897 2,737
AgGDP share of GDP (%) 38.4 29.2 26.1 45.0 32.4 22.8 17.4
Exports/GDP (%) 25.4 16.0 23.5 17.1 11.9 23.7 24.1
Imports/GDP (%) 43.7 22.6 38.2 24.6 26.5 29.0 21.8
B. Share of AgGDP in 2002 (%)
Food crops 33.9 27.4 25.5 40.8 14.9 27.9 19.9
    Cereals 28.1 24.3 23.2 33.2 12.2 22.2 12.4
    Maize 27.5 0.7 19.7 26.5 11.1 19.1 9.7
Other crops 55.7 38.3 59.4 44.9 67.8 57.9 59.8
   Cotton 1.4 1.1 2.2 1.1 0.9 4.4 10.6
   Exportable fruits and vegetables 8.0 5.2 23.4 10.5 55.7 7.0 0.6
   Exportable tree crops 3.2 9.5 25.0 18.0 0.9 29.3 9.1
Livestock 10.4 34.3 15.1 14.2 17.3 14.2 20.4
Source: World Bank (2006), last accessed in March 2006.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.6 6    A P P E N D I X   A
Table A12  Results of Simulations 5 and 6: Improving marketing costs and growth in the nonagricultural 



























A. Selected agriculture (combination of Scenarios 1, 2, and 4)
Malawi 0.47 0.89 2.87 –0.78 3.43 1.30 –1.86 0.44 0.27
Madagascar 0.82 1.99 3.95 –0.80 1.13 2.63 1.88 1.16 0.38
Mozambique 0.33 1.39 1.65 –0.45 0.58 4.43 1.43 0.54 0.18
Tanzania 0.76 1.07 2.25 –0.66 1.12 4.52 0.46 0.78 0.92
Uganda 0.66 1.49 1.42 0.18 1.72 4.44 1.62 1.14 0.32
Zambia 0.32 0.68 2.26 –0.60 –0.44 5.88 0.36 0.45 0.34
Zimbabwe 0.27 0.83 4.73 –0.67 1.95 2.25 0.27 0.30 0.12
B. With reducing marketing costs (Scenario 5)
Malawi 1.13 1.97 3.30 –0.46 8.78 4.17 0.43 0.86 0.48
Madagascar 1.24 2.86 4.14 –0.46 3.36 4.50 2.85 1.64 0.61
Mozambique 0.62 1.99 1.88 –0.19 1.37 5.72 2.08 0.85 0.42
Tanzania 1.13 1.88 2.54 –0.36 2.47 5.67 1.32 1.30 1.06
Uganda 0.95 2.21 1.50 0.61 3.18 6.18 2.42 1.68 0.52
Zambia 1.06 1.90 2.88 –0.35 1.82 8.43 1.69 0.83 0.64
Zimbabwe 0.73 2.11 5.15 –0.45 5.14 4.23 2.06 0.63 0.34
C. With nonagricultural growth (Scenario 6)
Malawi 2.40 4.38 4.47 0.37 8.50 4.92 3.46 1.99 0.89
Madagascar 1.92 4.05 4.58 0.02 3.93 3.61 3.93 2.32 0.27
Mozambique 1.77 3.87 2.80 0.76 2.22 5.72 3.91 2.19 1.26
Tanzania 1.98 3.45 3.21 0.36 2.44 4.65 2.89 2.47 1.30
Uganda 1.44 3.02 1.69 1.22 3.80 5.11 3.15 2.43 1.21
Zambia 2.12 4.05 3.83 0.37 1.58 7.82 3.96 1.84 0.79
Zimbabwe 1.67 3.92 6.19 0.13 5.50 4.45 4.12 1.55 0.93
Source: CGE model results.TABLES     67
Table A13  Results of Simulations 5 and 6: Improving marketing costs and growth in the nonagricultural sector 
(with unemployed unskilled labor) (additional per capita annual growth rate, %)
















A.  Selected agriculture (combination of Scenarios 1, 2, and 4)
Malawi 0.70 1.11 3.16 –0.87 3.61 1.58 –1.61 0.47
Madagascar 1.51 2.52 4.74 –1.12 0.19 4.61 2.63 1.12
Mozambique 0.60 1.81 2.04 –0.56 0.38 5.22 2.04 0.37
Tanzania 1.22 1.46 2.84 –0.85 0.85 5.71 1.06 1.43
Uganda 1.44 2.23 2.53 –0.27 1.25 6.57 2.79 0.68
Zambia 0.54 0.98 2.57 –0.69 –0.65 6.93 0.81 0.48
Zimbabwe 0.39 0.87 4.89 –0.72 1.97 2.47 0.37 0.22
B.  With reducing marketing costs (Scenario 5)
Malawi 1.59 2.40 3.88 –0.64 9.07 4.71 0.93 0.86
Madagascar 2.23 3.64 5.26 –0.92 2.03 7.36 3.95 1.66
Mozambique 1.06 2.66 2.51 –0.38 1.07 6.98 3.05 0.72
Tanzania 1.89 2.52 3.53 –0.66 2.01 7.68 2.34 1.91
Uganda 2.11 3.30 3.14 –0.05 2.52 9.37 4.16 1.04
Zambia 1.48 2.49 3.47 –0.53 1.39 10.40 2.56 0.92
Zimbabwe 0.99 2.21 5.48 –0.55 5.15 4.71 2.27 0.56
C.  With nonagricultural growth (Scenario 6)
Malawi 3.47 5.40 5.81 –0.06 9.20 6.18 4.65 1.78
Madagascar 3.32 5.16 6.18 –0.62 2.05 7.65 5.49 1.76
Mozambique 2.91 5.62 4.43 0.28 1.42 8.95 6.45 2.03
Tanzania 3.44 4.70 5.09 –0.22 1.50 8.42 4.86 2.92
Uganda 3.11 4.60 4.07 0.27 2.85 9.68 5.69 1.98
Zambia 3.06 5.39 5.14 0.00 0.46 12.12 5.93 1.41
Zimbabwe 2.31 4.19 7.01 –0.12 5.52 5.64 4.68 1.47
Source: CGE model results.69
APPENDIX B
Mathematical Presentation 
of the CGE Model7 0    A P P E N D I X   B
Table B1  Country and sector aggregation in the model
Countries and country groups Commodities and commodity groups
1.   Botswana
2.   Madagascar
3.   Malawi
4.   Mozambique
5.   Republic of South Africa
6.   Tanzania
7.   Uganda
8.   Zambia
9.   Zimbabwe
10. Southern African Custom Union
11. Rest of Southern Africa
12. Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
13. Morocco
14. Tunisia
15. Rest of North Africa
16. China
17. India
18. Rest of Asia
19. United States
20. European Union and European Free Trade Area
21. Other Europe
22. Rest of world
1.   Paddy rice
2.   Wheat
3.   Other grains (mainly maize)
4.   Exportable vegetables and fruits 
5.   Domestic vegetables and fruits
6.   Oilseeds
7.   Sugarcane and sugar beet
8.   Plant-based fibers (mainly cotton)
9.   Other exportable crops (mainly tree crops)
10. Other domestic crops





16. Cattle, sheep, and goat meat products
17. Other meat products




22. Processed food products
23. Beverages and tobacco products
24. Energy products
25. Minerals
26. Textiles and clothing
27. Heavy industrial products
28. Machinery and equipment
29. Electricity, water, and urban utility supply
30. Wholesale and retail trade services
31. Transportation
32. Water and air transportation
33. Other services
34. Public administrative, education, and health 
servicesMATHEMATICAL PRESENTATION OF THE CGE MODEL       71
Model Notation 
The subscripts i and j in the following variables and parameters refer to commodity/sector set, 
in which otp is a specific element to represent transport sector, f refers to factors, and r and s 
refer to country/regional group set.
Variables
Production Side
PXi,r  Producer price of good i in country r
PVAi,r  Value added price of good i in country r
WFf,r  Returns to factor f in country r
Xi,r  Output of sector i produced in country r
FDf,i,r  Factor demand of f by sector i in country r
FSf,r        Total supply of factor f in country r
INTDi,r        Intermediate demand of good i in country r
Demand Side
YHr            Household total income in country r
GOVREVr  Government revenue in country r
ZTOTr         Total investment in country r
GOVTRANr      Government transfers to household in country r
CDi,r          Household demand of good i in country r
GDi,r          Government demand of good i in country r
INVDi,r        Investment demand of good i in country r
Trade
PWMi,r,s  CIF price of good i for country s imported from r
PWEi,r,s  FOB price of good i for country r exporting to country s
PMi,r,s  Import price of good i in the domestic market of country s and imported 
from country r
PEi,r,s  Export price of good i at the border of country r and exporting to country s
PMMi,r         Armington price of import-composite good i for country r
PEEi,r         CET price of export-composite good i in country r
PDi,r          Price for output i domestically produced and consumed in country r
PCi,r          Armington price of composite good i in country r
Ei,r,s         Good i exporting from country r to country s
Mi,r,s         Good i imported by country s from country r
EEi,r          Export-composite good i for country r
MMi,r          Import-composite good i for country r
DCi,r          Output i domestically produced and consumed in country r
CCi,r         Composite good i for country r
TRANSPRi,r,s  International transport cost for good i shipping from country r to s
TSPRMi,r,s  Transport cost for good i imported by country s from country r incurred in 
the domestic markets of country s 
TSPREi,r,s   Transport cost for good i exporting from country r to country s and incurred 
in the domestic markets of country r 7 2    A P P E N D I X   B
Macro closures
FSAVEr   Fixed net foreign savings (trade deficits) of country r




i,r  Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and import-composite 
good i in country r
σm
i,r  Armington elasticity of substitution between imports of good i in country r 
imported from different exporting countries
σt
i,r  CET elasticity of substitution between domestic and export-composite good i 
in country r
σe
i,r  CET elasticity of substitution between exports of good i in country r 
  exporting to different importing countries
σx
i,r  Elasticity of substitution in CES value-added production function for sector i 
in country r




i,r  Share parameter in household’s demand function for good i in country r
ß
g
i,r  Share parameter in government’s demand function for good i in country r
ß
z
i,r  Share parameter in investment demand function for good i in country r
αc




i,r,s  Share parameters in Armington import function for good i imported by 
country s from country r
δe




i,r  Share parameters in CET function for export-composite good i in country r
δi,r  Share parameters in Armington function for import-composite good i 
  imported in country r
γi,r  Subsistence parameter in Stone-Geary utility function
Λm
i,r    Shift parameter for import good i by country r in Armington import 
function
Λc
i,r     Shift parameter for import-composite good i in Armington function in 
 country  r
Λe
i,r   Shift parameter for export good i in country r in CET export function
Λt
i,r   Shift parameter for export-composite good i in country r in CET function
Λx
i,r   Shift parameter for sector i in country r in CES value-added production 
functionMATHEMATICAL PRESENTATION OF THE CGE MODEL       73
Other Computed Parameters
øi,r,s  International transport margin for good i exported from country r to 
country s
øm
i,r,s  Transport margin for imports of good i paid to the domestic transport firm 
of importing country s and imported from country r
øe
i,r,s  Transport margin for exports of good i paid to the domestic transport firm 
of exporting country r and imported by country s
ioi,j,r  Input-output coefficient for good i used in sector j in country r
xtaxri,r,s  Export tax rate on good i in country r exporting to s
mtaxri,r,s  Import tax rate on good i in country s imported from country r
ptaxri,r  Producer tax on good i in country r
ctaxri,r  Commodity sales tax rate on good i in country r
hsaverr  Household saving rates in country r























Figure B1  Illustration of the CGE model: Within-country commodity/factor flow
CET
CES




Exports from B to A
= Imports by A from B
Exports from C to A
= Imports by A from C







Figure B2  Illustration of the CGE model: Trade flows between countriesMATHEMATICAL PRESENTATION OF THE CGE MODEL       75
B4. Model Equations
Relationship between CIF and FOB Prices
(1)  PWMi,s,r = (1+TRANSPRi,s,r) × PWEi,s,r
(1a)  TRANSPRi,s,r = øi,s,r × PWEotp,s,r
Production and Input Demand
CES value-added function
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Import price in domestic markets
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Identification between imports by country r from country s and exports from country s to 
country r
(18)  Mi,s,r = Ei,s,r
Final Demand and Income
Household income
(19)  YH WF FD GOVTRAN ,, , rf r f i r r
i f




































GOVREV xtaxr exr PWE E
mtaxr exr PWM M
PC ctaxr CC







r irs r irs irs
s i






































































(25)  CC CD GD INVD INTD ,, , i r ir ir ir i r =++ +
Factor market








## =- ^^ hh ! !! !79
References
Adelman, I. 1984. Beyond export-led growth. World Development 12 (9): 937–949.
AFDB (African Development Bank) and OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment). 2002. Achieving the millennium development goals in Africa: Progress, prospects, 
and policy implications. Paris: OECD.
Akiyama, T., J. Baffes, D. F. Larson, and P. Varangis. 2003. Commodity market reform in Africa. Policy 
Research Working Paper 2995. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Ashley, C., and S. Maxwell. 2001. Rethinking rural development. Development Policy Review 19 (4): 
395–425.
Bacon, C. (2005). Confronting the coffee crisis: Can fair trade, organic, and specialty coffees reduce 
small-scale farmer vulnerability in northern Nicaragua? World Development 33 (3): 497–511.
Baffes, J. 2003. Cotton, market setting, policies, issues, and facts. Policy Research Working Paper. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
———. 2006. Restructuring Uganda’s coffee industry: Why going back to basics matters. Develop-
ment Policy Review 24 (4): 413–436.
Baffes, J., and B. Gardner. 2003. The transmission of world commodity prices to domestic markets 
under policy reforms in developing countries. Journal of Policy Reforms 6 (3): 159–180.
Balassa, B. 1965. Trade liberalization and “revealed” comparative advantage. The Manchester School 
of Economic and Social Studies 33: 99–123.
Barrett, H., A. Brown, B. Ilbery, G. Jackson, and T. Bins. 1997. Prospect for horticultural exports under 
trade liberalization in adjusting African economies. Report submitted to the Department for 
International Development, Coventry University, Coventry, U.K.
Bell, C., and P. B. R. Hazell. 1980. Measuring the indirect effects of an agricultural investment project 
on its surrounding region. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62: 75–86.
Binns, T., and N. Fereday. 1996. Feeding African urban poor: Urban and peri-urban horticulture in 
Kano, Nigeria. Geography 81(4): 380–384.
Burfisher, M. E., S. Robinson, and K. Thierfelder. 2002. The global impacts of farm policy reforms in 
Organization for Economic Cooperation in developing countries. American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics 84 (3): 234–241.
Byerlee, D., and C. Eicher. 1997. Africa’s emerging maize revolution. Boulder, Colo., U.S.A.: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.
Calo, M., and T. A. Wise. 2005. Revaluing peasant coffee production: Organic and free trade markets 
in Mexico. Medford, Mass., U.S.A.: Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts 
University.
Cardenas, M. 1994. Stabilization and redistribution of coffee revenues: A political economy model of 
commodity marketing boards. Journal of Development Economics 44: 351–380.
Collier, P. 2005. Is agriculture still relevant to poverty reduction in Africa? Speech given to All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development, October 17, 2005, House of Commons, Lon-80   REFERENCES
don, U.K. <http://www.odi.org.uk/speeches/apgood_oct05/apgood_oct17/report.html>. Ac-
cessed August 2006.
Collins, J. 1995. Gender and cheap labor in agriculture. In Food and agrarian orders in the world 
economy, ed. P. McMichael. Westport, Conn., U.S.A.: Praeger.
DECPG (Development Economics Prospects Group, of the World Bank). 2006. Commodity Markets 
Review, July 12, 2006. < http://decpg.worldbank.org>. Accessed August 2006.
Dehn, J. 2000. Commodity price uncertainty in developing countries. Policy Research Working Paper 
2426. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Dervis, K., J. de Melo, and S. Robinson. 1982. General equilibrium models for development policy. 
World Research Publication. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Diao, X., and Y. Yanoma. 2003. Exploring regional dynamics in Sub-Saharan African agriculture. 
Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD) Discussion Paper 2. Washington, 
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Diao, X., T. Roe, and E. Yeldan. 1999. Strategic policies and growth: An applied model of R&D-driven 
endogenous growth. Journal of Development Economics 60: 343–380.
Diao, X., T. Roe, and A. Somwaru. 2002. Developing country interests in agricultural reforms under the 
World Trade Organization. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84 (3): 782–790.
Diao, X., P. Hazell, D. Resnick, and J. Thurlow. 2006. The role of agriculture in development: Impli-
cations for Sub-Saharan Africa. Development Strategy and Governance Division Discussion 
Paper 29. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Dolan, C., and J. Humphrey. 2000. Governance and trade in fresh vegetables: The impact of U.K. 
supermarkets on the African horticulture industry. Proceedings, 2000 Conference. University 
of Sussex, U.K.: Institute of Development Studies.
Dolan, C., J. Humphrey, and C. Harris-Pascal. 1999. Horticultural commodity chains: The impact of 
the U.K. market on the African fresh vegetable industry. Working Paper 96. University of Sus-
sex, U.K.: Institute of Development Studies.
Dorosh, P. A. 2001. Trade liberalization and national food security: Rice trade between Bangladesh and 
India. World Development 29 (4): 673–690.
Dorosh, P., and S. Haggblade. 2003. Growth linkages, price effects and income distribution in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Journal of African Economies 12 (2): 207–235.
Dorosh, P., D. E. Sahn, and S. D. Younger. 1996. Exchange rate, fiscal and agricultural policies in Af-
rica: Does adjustment hurt the poor? World Development 24 (4): 719–747.
Dorward, A., J. Kydd, and C. Poulton. 2005. Beyond liberalization: Developmental coordination poli-
cies for African smallholder agriculture. IDS Bulletin 36 (2): 80–85.
Dréze, J., and A. Sen. 1989. Political and public action. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ellis, F. 2005. “Small farms, livelihood diversification, and rural-urban transitions: strategic issues in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.” In The future of small farms. Proceedings of a workshop held by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute/2020 Vision Initiative, Overseas Development Ini-
tiative, and Imperial College London, June 26-29, 2005, in Wye, United Kingdom. Washington, 
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2000. Export crop liberalization in 
Africa. FAO Agricultural Services Bulletin 135.
———. 2002. World agriculture: towards 2015/2030. Summary Report. Rome: FAO. 
FAOSTAT. 2006. FAO Statistical Database. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 
Rome, Italy. <http://faostat.fao.org/>. Accessed March 2006.REFERENCES     81
Fitter, R., and R. Kaplinsky. 2001. Who gains from product rents as the coffee market becomes more dif-
ferentiated? A value chain analysis. IDS Bulletin Paper. University of Sussex, Brighton, U.K.
Gabre-Madhin, E. Z. 2001. Market institutions, transaction costs, and social capital in the Ethiopian 
grain market. Research Report 124. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute.
GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project). 2005. GTAP database, v6 ( in CD). W es t Laf a y ette , Ind. , 
U.S.A.: Purdue University.
Haggblade, S., J. Hammer, and P. B. R. Hazell. 1991. Modeling agricultural growth multipliers. Ameri-
can Journal of Agricultural Economics 73(2): 361–374.
Hallam, D., P. Liu, G. Lavers, P. Pilkauskas, G. Rapsomanikis, and G. Claro. 2004. The market for non-
traditional agricultural exports. FAO Commodities and Trade Technical Paper 3. Rome: FAO. 
Harris, C., P.  V. Hegarty, M. Kherallah, C. Mukindia, J. Ngige, P. Sterns, and J. Tatter. 2001. The 
impacts of standards on the food sector of Kenya. Report prepared by the Institute for Food 
and Agricultural Standards, Michigan State University, for the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. East Lansing: Michigan State University.
Harris, S. 1992. Kenya horticulture sub-sector survey. Nairobi, Kenya: Export Development Support 
Project..
Hazell, P. 2005. Does policy research matter? A farewell lecture, November 21, 2005. Washington, 
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Henson, S., A. Brouder, and W. Mitullah. 2000. Food safety requirements and food exports from 
developing countries: The case of fish exports from Kenya to the European Union. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 82 (5): 1159–1169.
Humphrey, J., N. McCulloch, and M. Ota. 2004. The impact of European market changes on employ-
ment in the Kenyan horticulture sector. Journal of International Development 16(1): 63–80.
ICAC (International Cotton Advisory Committee). 2005. <http://www.icac.org>. Accessed June 
2005.
ICCO (International Cocoa Organization). 2006. <http://www.icco.org>. Accessed July 14, 2006.
ICO (International Coffee Organization). 2006. <http://www.ico.org>. Accessed July 14, 2006.
ICRISAT. 2001. Sparking a grey-to-green revolution for dry areas: 28 years of ICRISAT’s partnership-
based research across the semi-arid tropics. <http://www.icrisat.org/text/news/2001/grey-to-
green.htm>. Accessed June 2005.
IMF/WB Development Committee. 2001. Leveraging Trade for Development: World Bank Role. 
Mimeo: p. 3.
Islam, N. 1990. Horticultural exports of developing countries: Past performances, future prospects, 
and policy issues. Research Report 80. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute.
Jayne, T. S., M. Mukumbu, M. Chisvo, D. Tschirley, M. T. Weber, B. Zulu, R. Johansson, P. Santos, and 
D. Soroko. 1999. Successes and challenges of food market reform: Experiences from Kenya, 
Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. MSU International Development Working Paper No. 
72. East Lansing: Michigan State University.
Karanja, A. 2002. Liberalisation and smallholder agriculture development: A case study of coffee 
farms in Central Kenya. Working Paper. Wageningen, Netherlands: Wageningen University.
Kherallah, M., C. Delgado, E. Gabre-Madhin, N. Minot, and M. Johnson. 2002. Reforming agricul-
tural markets in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Krivonos, E. 2004. The impact of coffee market reforms on producer prices and price transmission. 
Policy Research Working Paper 3358. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.82   REFERENCES
Limao, N., and A. J. Venables. 2001. Infrastructure, geographical disadvantage, transport cost, and 
trade. World Bank Economic Review 15(3): 451–479.
Little, P. D., and C. S. Dolan. 1998. What it means to be restructured: Non-traditional commodities 
and structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Rethinking commodities: Anthropological 
views of the global market place, eds. P. Stone, A. Haugerud, and P. D. Little. Madison, Wis., 
U.S.A.: University of Wisconsin Press.
Maxwell, S., and R. Slater. 2003. Food policy old and new. Development Policy Review 21 (5–6): 
531–553.
McCulloch, N., and M. Ota. 2002. Export horticulture and poverty in Kenya. Working paper. Brighton, 
U.K.: University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies.
Minot, N., and M. Ngigi. 2002. Are horticultural exports a replicable success story? Evidence from 
Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Re-
search Institute.
———. 2003. Are horticultural exports a replicable success story? Evidence from Kenya and Côte 
d’Ivoire. Paper presented at the International Conference of Successes in African Agriculture: 
Building for the Future, December 1–3, 2003, Pretoria, South Africa.
Mundlak, Y., and D. F. Larson. 1992. On the transmission of world agricultural prices. The World Bank 
Economic Review 6 (3): 399–422.
Muradian, R., and W. Pelupessy. 2005. Governing the coffee chain: The role of voluntary regulatory 
systems. World Development 33 (12): 2029–2044.
Ng, F., and A. Yeats. 2002. What can Africa expect from its traditional exports? Africa Region Work-
ing Paper 26. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Nin Pratt, A., and X. Diao. 2006. Exploring growth linkages and market opportunities for agriculture 
in Southern Africa. Development Strategy and Governance Division Discussion Paper 42. 
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Noman, A., and J. Stiglitz. 2006. IPD’s Africa Task Force: Issues note. A note for the meeting to 
launch the Task Force on August 3–4, 2006, at Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of 
Manchester, U.K.
Oyejide, T. A., E. O. Ogunkola, and S. A. Bankole. 2000. Quantifying the trade impact of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards: What is known and issues of importance for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Paper prepared for the workshop on Quantifying the Trade Effect of Standards and Regulatory 
Barriers: Is It Possible? Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Ponte, S. 2001. The “Latte Revolution”? Winners and losers in the restructuring of the global coffee 
marketing chain. Working Paper. Copenhagen: Center for Development Research.
Poulton, C., J. Kydd, and A. Dorward. 2006. Overcoming market constraints on pro-poor agricultural 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Development Policy Review 24 (3): 243–277.
Quiroz, J., and R. Soto. 1995. International price signals in agricultural prices: Do governments care? 
Mimeo. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Reardon, T., C. P. Timmer, C. Barrett, and J. Berdegue. 2003. The rise of supermarkets in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85 (5): 1140–1146.
Reimer, J. J., and T. W. Hertel. 2004. International cross section estimates of demand for use in the 
GTAP model. GTAP Technical Paper 23. West Lafayette, Ind., U.S.A.: Purdue University.
Rosegrant, M. W., M. Paisner, S. Meijer, and J. Witcover. 2001. Global food projects to 2020. Wash-
ington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Sanders, J., B. Shapiro, and S. Ramasamy. 1996. The economics of agricultural technology in semiarid 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.REFERENCES     83
SIDA (2006). What can Sub-Saharan Africa learn from Asian experiences in addressing its food cri-
sis? Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Division for Rural 
Development.
Singh, B. P. 2002. Nontraditional crop production in Africa for export. In Trends in new crops and new 
uses, eds. J. Janick and A. Whipkey. Alexandria, Va., U.S.A.: ASHS Press.
Skees, J., P. Hazell, and M. Miranda. 1999. New approaches to crop yield insurance in developing 
countries. Environment and Production Technology Division Discussion Paper 55. Washington, 
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Stevens, C. 2003. Food trade and food policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Old myths and new challenges. 
Development Policy Review 21 (5–6): 669–681.
Talbot, J. M. 1995–96. Regulating the coffee commodity chain: Internationalization and the coffee 
cartel. Berkley Journal of Sociology 40: 113–149.
———. 1997. Where does your coffee dollar go?: The division of income and surplus along the coffee 
commodity chain. Studies in Comparative International Development 32 (1): 56–91.
Temu, A., and A. Winter-Nelson. 2002. Institutional adjustment and agricultural markets: Following 
the transaction costs in the Tanzanian coffee system. World Development 30(4): 561–574.
Thoen, R., S. Jaffee, C. Dolan, and F. Ba. 2001. Equatorial rose: The Kenyan–European cut flower 
supply chain. Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Townsend, T., and A. Guichounts. 1994. A survey of cotton income and price support programs. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Proceedings of Belt-wide Cotton Conferences.
UNCOMTRADE (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database). 2002. Rev 3.
———. 2005. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade. Accessed April 2005.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 2001. Economic development in 
Africa: Performance, prospects, and policy issues. New York, Geneva.
Varangis, P., and G. Schreiber. 2001. Coffee market reforms in West Africa. In Commodity market 
reforms: Lessons of two decades, eds. T. Akiyama, J. Baffes, D. F. Larson, and P. Varangis. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Von Braun, J. 1994. Nontraditional vegetable crops and food security among smallholder farmers in 
Guatemala. In Agricultural commercialization, economic development, and nutrition. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press.
WARDA. 2006. NERICA on the Move. <http://www.warda.org/warda/uplandnerica.asp>. Accessed 
June 2005.
Weatherspoon, D. D., and T. Reardon. 2003. The rise of supermarkets in Africa: Implications for agri-
food systems and the rural poor. Development Policy Review 21 (3): 333–355.
World Bank. 2004. Global poverty down by half since 1981, but progress uneven as economic growth 
eludes many countries. News Release No. 2004/309/S,23 April 2004. <http://www.worldbank.
org/data/wdi2004/index.htm>. Accessed June 2005.
World Bank. 2006. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. CD-ROM.
Yeats, A. J. 1998. What can be expected from African regional trade arrangements? Some empirical 
evidence. Unpublished memorandum. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.